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ACCOUNT ME IN: AGENCIES IN QUEST OF
ACCOUNTABILITY
Dorit Rubinstein Reiss*
INTRODUCTION
Not long after taking office, Lisa Jackson, appointed by
President Obama as Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”) revamped the evaluation procedure for the EPA’s
Integrated Risk Information System (“IRIS”) database.1 The
database was an initiative undertaken by the EPA to improve the
* Associate Professor of Law, UC Hastings College of the Law. I would like to
thank Oded Na’aman for his very useful suggestions; Heather Field for sharing
her immense expertise about the IRS; also, Marsha Cohen for her aid in
conducting the research and Ashutosh Bhagwat, Marsha Cohen, David
Coolidge, Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen, Elizabeth Magill, Jerry Mashaw, Anne
Joseph O’Connell, Reuel Schiller, and Glen Staszewski for their helpful
comments and suggestions on previous drafts. I am very grateful to Peter Barton
Hutt, Richard Merrill, Deborah Wolf, and other interviewees to whom I
promised confidentiality (and therefore cannot name them) for generously
sharing their stories and their valuable time with me. Finally, I wish to thank
Fatemeh Shahangian for her excellent research assistance. All errors are, of
course, my own.
1
The EPA’s website explains that:
The Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS) is a human health
assessment program that evaluates quantitative and qualitative risk
information on effects that may result from exposure to environmental
contaminants. IRIS was initially developed for EPA staff in response to
a growing demand for consistent information on substances for use in
risk assessments, decision-making, and regulatory activities. The
information in IRIS is intended for those without extensive training in
toxicology, but with some knowledge of health sciences.
Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS), U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/iris/index.cfm (last visited Jan. 30, 2011).
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scientific accuracy and the quality of information available on risks
associated with certain chemicals; it is used, for example, when the
EPA determines whether to establish air and water quality
standards regulating certain chemicals.2 IRIS assessments are
neither rules nor adjudications; rather, they are background
materials later used in making rules. Therefore, they are invisible
to the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).3 The procedures
surrounding the IRIS database—as with everything related to the
project—were designed by the EPA and are not mandated by law.4
In spite of this potential freedom to choose any or no
accountability mechanisms, the procedure the EPA adopted for
IRIS—from the start of the system—included extensive steps of
review, and numerous opportunities for input and checks by
external actors.5 The additional procedures put in place by
Administrator Jackson aimed at achieving a process that is “more
transparent and timely, and . . . will ensure the highest level of
scientific integrity.”6
The adopted process exposed the EPA’s suggestions to external
peer review, in addition to notice and comment, by using the same
process required for informal rulemaking under the APA;7 it also
subjected these suggestions to review by the Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) in the White House’s Office of
Management and Budget (“OMB”), which is required for
significant rules.8 Most of these elements were part of the IRIS
2

See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-440, CHEMICAL
ASSESSMENTS: LOW PRODUCTIVITY AND NEW INTERAGENCY REVIEW PROCESS
LIMIT THE USEFULNESS AND CREDIBILITY OF EPA’S INTEGRATED RISK
INFORMATION SYSTEM, 6–8 (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d08440.pdf.
3
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 551–559 (West 2010).
4
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 2, at 10.
5
See infra Part III.B (describing these procedures in detail).
6
Memorandum from Lisa P. Jackson, Administrator, Envtl. Prot. Agency,
New Process for Development of Integrated Risk Information System Health
Assessments, 1–2 (May 21, 2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/iris/pdfs/
IRIS_PROCESS_MEMO.5.21.09.PDF.
7
See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 553 (West 2010).
8
See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. § 601 app. at 557–61 (1994). For a discussion of the regulatory review of
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system from the start; in one form or another, the agency
voluntarily chose to expose its decisions to extensive scrutiny from
various outside parties.
Similarly, as part of the reform of the Internal Revenue Service
(“IRS”) after 1998, Commissioner Rossotti and the IRS staff
worked hard to increase the agency’s responsiveness and
transparency. The agency put substantial efforts into making the
Internal Revenue Manual more accessible, as discussed more
extensively in Part III.C. It invested in improving customer service
and, consequently, the number of calls answered rose dramatically,
and the quality of the IRS’ response received very positive
reviews.9 Improvement in service was required under the 1998
legislation reforming the IRS.10 However, Congress had previously
passed other reforms requiring improvements in customer
service—for example taxpayer rights provisions in the 1980s—but
without sincere agency commitment and agency initiated efforts,
those had limited effect.11 This time, the agency was committed to
improving customer service and put in place changes increasing
transparency and responsiveness.
Finally, before the courts started requiring that agencies answer
each comment submitted to them, and before agencies took the
spirit of the Freedom of Information Act seriously, the FDA, under
the direction of its Chief Counsel, Peter Baron Hutt, adopted
procedures that involved responding to comments submitted to it
and an approach to transparency that involved making as much

rules, see Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review
of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1075–82 (1986) and John D.
Graham et al., Managing the Regulatory State: The Experience of the Bush
Administration, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 953, 960–75 (2006).
9
CHARLES O. ROSSOTTI, MANY UNHAPPY RETURNS: ONE MAN’S QUEST TO
TURN AROUND THE MOST UNPOPULAR ORGANIZATION IN AMERICA 134–36
(2005); Hal G. Rainey & James Thompson, Leadership and the Transformation
of a Major Institution: Charles Rossotti and the Internal Revenue Service, 66
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 596, 599–600 (2006).
10
See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998,
Pub. Law 105-206, July 22, 1998, available at http://www.gpo.gov:80/
fdsys/pkg/PLAW-105publ206/pdf/PLAW-105publ206.pdf.
11
ROSSOTTI, supra note 9, at 129–30.
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information as possible publicly available.12
Often, we assume that agencies are the villains in the
“accountability game,” the quest to be accountable. Much of the
literature about accountability sees agencies as obstacles. It is often
taken for granted that agencies will avoid accountability as much
as they can, and that pressure to accept accountability will be
required as a matter of course. Other scholars, in response,
emphasize the multiple and conflicting pressures for accountability
placed on agencies, and see them as victims of too much
accountability. This approach sees agencies as merely passive
actors in this area, subjected to accountability mechanisms against
their will and with no real control or influence on their
accountability environment.
While there is much truth to both perspectives, they each miss
an important part of the picture. As the examples above suggest,
agencies are not always the enemies of accountability. Nor are they
always helpless, passive pawns, crushed under the oppressive
weight of accountability. Agencies can also be autonomous and
important actors in the accountability game, creating new forms of
accountability, or accepting and adapting pre-existing forms. They
often willingly join in and strive to be accountable. They may well
invest substantial efforts in increasing their accountability.
Not all agencies do this all the time, and not all agencies do it
well. But in today’s administrative environment, agencies need
accountability, and being sophisticated actors, they work at
achieving it. Their efforts happen for a number of reasons—
internal and external—and not just because of cost/benefit
considerations.
This Article examines such actions by agencies and addresses
the reasons they take the actions they do. Following this
introduction, the article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides the
background, reviewing current literature and demonstrating the
tendency to place agencies in either the villain or the victim camp,
as well as discussing the very few studies that focus on agencies’
own contribution to the accountability regime surrounding them.
Part II reiterates that agencies seek accountability and addresses
12

See infra Part III.A.
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possible explanations for such behavior. The explanations
highlighted are rational choice (agencies seek to be accountable
because the costs of not being accountable are too high), power of
ideas, and internalization of the idea that accountability is part of
the administrative agents’ mission. Part III provides a small
number of more detailed case studies of agencies which sought to
increase their accountability, and includes examples from the FDA,
the IRS, and the EPA. This discussion shows that the phenomenon
is a real and common one, and provides empirical support for the
explanations addressed in Part II for this behavior. Finally, Part IV
discusses implications for theory and practice of accountability in
the administrative state.
I. BACKGROUND: ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
Accountability of administrative agencies is an ongoing
concern in the administrative state. Agencies exercise tremendous
power and engage in numerous activities.13 Not surprisingly,
controlling them has been a constant preoccupation of scholars,
politicians, and citizens, and an extensive literature discussing

13

See, e.g., KENNETH J. MEIER, POLITICS AND THE BUREAUCRACY:
POLICYMAKING IN THE FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 2 (3d ed. 1992):
Today’s citizens awake in the morning to breakfasts of bacon and eggs,
both certified as fit for consumption by the United States Department of
Agriculture (although the Department of Health and Human Services
would urge you to eat a breakfast lower in cholesterol). Breakfast is
rudely interrupted by a phone call; the cost of phone service is
determined by a state regulatory commission. When our citizens drive
to work, their cars’ emissions are controlled by a catalytic converter
mandated by the Environmental Protection Agency. The cars have seat
belts, padded dashboards, collapsible steering columns and air bags
required by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. When
our citizens stop for gasoline, they pay a price that is partly determined
by the energy policies (or a lack thereof) administered by the
Department of Energy. To take their minds off the bureaucracies
regulating their lives, the bureaucratic citizens turn on their radios.
Each radio station is licensed by the Federal Communications
Commission, and all advertising is subject to the rules and regulations
of the Federal Trade Commission.
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accountability exists.14 This “accountability literature” has covered
much ground and taught us much; however, it tends to treat the
accountability environment the agencies face as something that
agencies either manipulate to achieve their goals or something to
which they are subject. In the terms mentioned above, it tends to
treat agencies as either villains or victims.15
14

Here is a small sample of studies with the word “accountability” or
“accountable” in the title from the last thirty years: ROBERT D. BEHN,
RETHINKING DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY (2001); PATRICIA DAY &
RUDOLPH KLEIN, ACCOUNTABILITIES: FIVE PUBLIC SERVICES (1987); PUBLIC
ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES (Michael W. Dowdle
ed. 2006); BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATIONS, CRIME AND
ACCOUNTABILITY (1993); WILLIAM T. GORMLEY, JR. & STEVEN J. BALLA,
BUREAUCRACY AND DEMOCRACY: ACCOUNTABILITY AND PERFORMANCE (2d
ed. 2004); CAROL HARLOW, ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2002);
Giandomenico Majone, Independence vs. Accountability: Non-Majoritarian
Institutions and Democratic Government in Europe (European Univ. Inst.,
Working Paper No. 3, 1994); BERYL A. RADIN, THE ACCOUNTABLE JUGGLER
(2002); Edward Rubin, The Myth of Non-Bureaucratic Accountability and the
Anti-Administrative Impulse, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS
AND EXPERIENCES, supra, at 52; Robert S. Gilmour & Laura S. Jensen,
Reinventing Government Accountability: Public Functions, Privatization, and
the Meaning of “State Action,” 58 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 247 (1998); Jonathan G.
S. Koppell, Pathologies of Accountability: ICANN and the Challenge of
“Multiple Accountabilities Disorder,” 65 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 94 (2005); Peter J.
May, Regulatory Regimes and Accountability, 1 REG. & GOVERNANCE 8 (2007);
Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in
the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461 (2003); Peter M. Shane,
Political Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances: The Case of
Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161 (1995); Edward P.
Weber, The Question of Accountability in Historical Perspective: From Jackson
to Contemporary Grassroots Ecosystem Management, 31 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 451
(1999); William F. West, Formal Procedures, Informal Processes,
Accountability, and Responsiveness in Bureaucratic Policy Making: An
Institutional Policy Analysis, 64 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 66 (2004). These are not, of
course, the only ones and do not really cover all the studies about accountability
that do not use the term in the title.
15
This terminology is inspired by, though it is not directly drawing on,
Julian Le Grand’s classification of the way those drawing and operating the
welfare state are viewed. See Julian Le Grand, Knights, Knaves or Pawns?
Human Behavior and Social Policy, 26 J. SOC. POL’Y 149, 153–60 (1992)
(describing how loss of faith in the welfare state led to seeing the officials
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A. Agencies as the Villains
Much of the writing about agencies today portrays them as the
enemy, or the villain, of the accountability story. There are several
varieties of this approach. The most neutral one, the one least
hostile to agencies, explains the need for accountability as a
principal-agent problem: Congress created agencies to do its
bidding. Agencies may have their own interests and prefer to
follow their own preferences16 (or the preferences of the industries
they are captured by)17 rather than follow the wishes of Congress.
administering it as “knaves” instead of “knights” and the people drawing
benefits as “knaves” instead of “pawns”).
16
See, e.g., J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition
to Control Delegated Power, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1443 (2003) (utilizing an
empirical study of ESA to undermine the traditional principal agency
relationship between Congress and government agencies); John D. DiIulio, Jr.,
Principled Agents: The Cultural Bases of Behavior in a Federal Government
Bureaucracy, 4 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 277 (1994) (critiquing the
principal agent model of bureaucratic behavior from the perspective of the
Federal Bureau of Prisons); Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative
Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 248–
49 (1987) [hereinafter McCubbins, Administrative Procedures] (advocating
“oversight” and “administrative procedures” as a means to control bureaucratic
decisions); Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Policy and
Politics: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75
VA. L. REV. 431, 432–33 (1989) [hereinafter McCubbins, Structure and
Process] (identifying and analyzing the problem of effective political control of
an agency).
17
See, e.g., STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE
POSSIBILITY OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 18–22 (2008); Tim Bartley
& Marc Schneiberg, Rationality and Institutional Contingency: The Varying
Politics of Economic Regulation in the Fire Insurance Industry, 45 SOC. PERSP.
47, 47 (2002) (proposing that government agencies act according to their
connected industries as a result of being “defined” by those industries); Michael
E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the
Public Agenda. Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG 167 (1990) (striving
“to fit public interest characterizations into the social science literature to make
them operationally usable and testable”); James T. O’Reilly, Losing Deference
in the FDA’s Second Century: Judicial Review, Politics, and a Diminished
Legacy of Expertise, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 939 (2008) [hereinafter O’Reilly,
Losing Deference] (identifiying the diminished deference to the FDA as a result
of the Bush administration’s policital control of the agency); Sidney A. Shapiro
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Without accountability, agencies would be free to go their own
ways and ignore Congress. Under this theory, scholars of the
administrative state should address mechanisms of oversight over
agencies, examine them, evaluate them, and suggest
improvements.18
A more extreme version of the agencies as villains narrative
focuses, instead, on examples of agency abuse and misconduct and
uses that to demonstrate that agencies, whenever they can, make
& Rena Steinzor, Capture, Accountability, and Regulatory Metrics, 86 TEX. L.
REV. 1741, 1742 (2008) (advocating the use of the internet to hold agencies
accountable for their failures and successes).
18
Some of this literature focuses on Congressional oversight. See, e.g., B.
DAN WOOD & RICHARD W. WATERMAN, BUREAUCRATIC DYNAMICS: THE ROLE
OF BUREAUCRACY IN A DEMOCRACY 33–35 (1994) (seeking to dispel the “myth”
of unresponsive bureaucracy while suggesting additional Congressional
oversight); Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme
Court, and the Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 DUKE L.J. 819,
825–29 (1988) (analyzing the trend toward Congressional control); Barry R.
Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control?
Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON.
765, 766 (1983) (amending the regulatory approach by “incorporating the
legislature” into the process). Some of it examines oversight by the president.
See, e.g., STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY
EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 4 (Yale Univ.
Press 2008) (advocating for executive oversight by arguing against the
constitutionality of Congress’ efforts to insulate executive control with
government agencies); DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF
AGENCY DESIGN: POLITICAL INSULATION IN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
BUREAUCRACY 1946–1997, 26–28 (Stanford Univ. Press 2003) (arguing that the
agency model is a product of politics and an irrational plan for administration);
Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2246,
2248–50, 2277–82 (2001) (supporting the concept of presidential control over
regulatory agencies to achieve positive objectives). Some of it focuses on the
courts. See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Transformation of the U.S. Rulemaking
Process—For Better or Worse, 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 469, 473–77 (2008)
[hereinafter Lubbers, The Transformation] (criticizing both Congress and the
President and emphasizing the role of the courts based on the diminishing
activity during the note and comment period); McCubbins, Administrative
Procedures, supra note 16, at 243; Gregory L. Ogden, Analysis of Three Current
Trends in Administrative Law: Reducing Administrative Delay, Expanding
Public Participation, and Increasing Agency Accountability, 7 PEPP. L. REV.
553, 556–79 (1979–1980).
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themselves as unaccountable as possible and actively avoid the
control mechanisms put in place by others. Many of these studies
therefore suggest increased controls or improved enforcement of
existing controls.
For example, in a number of recent studies, scholars have
demonstrated that agencies avoid some of the procedures put in
place by the APA. In a very recent article, Michael Kolber
demonstrated that the FDA tended to use the procedure known as
“direct final rulemaking,” in which an agency publishes a rule
without going through the notice and comment process
beforehand,19 not as it was intended, i.e., for non-controversial
rules where notice and comment is a waste of time,20 but instead
for rules expected to be controversial.21 These findings about the
FDA are also reflected in an article by Lars Noah criticizing that
agency for cavalierly ignoring legal and statutory requirements22
(even though Noah acknowledges that these “subversive” actions
are part of the reason the agency has done “fairly well” in
protecting the public health in the face of limited resources,
19

For a general discussion of direct final rulemaking, see Ronald M. Levin,
Direct Final Rulemaking, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1995) (detailing the history
and analyzing the strengths of direct final rulemaking), and Ronald M. Levin,
More on Direct Final Rulemaking: Streamlining, Not Corner-Cutting, 51
ADMIN. L. REV. 757 (1999) [hereinafter Levin, More on Direct Final
Rulemaking] (defending direct final rulemaking and emphasizing the necessity
for restraint instead of abandonment). In a critical vein, see Lars Noah, Doubts
About Direct Final Rulemaking, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 401 (1999) (arguing that the
procedure of direct final rulemaking is invalid under existing law).
20
The point of direct final rulemaking is to do away with notice and
comment in cases where there will be no comments submitted because the rule
is non-controversial. See Levin, More on Direct Final Rulemaking, supra note
19, at 758–60. For further discussion of the waste of time resulting from use of
notice and comment in certain cases, see Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Tailored
Participation: Modernizing the APA Rulemaking Procedures, 12 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 321 (2009) [hereinafter Reiss, Tailored Participation].
21
Michael Strauss Kolber, Direct Final Rulemaking in the FDA: Lessons
from the First Decade 4, 23 (June 8, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1121550.
22
Lars Noah, The Little Agency that Could (Act with Indifference to
Constitutional and Statutory Strictures), 93 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 903–05
(2008).
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controversial issues, lack of leadership, and problematic legislative
directives).23 In a similar vein, Kristine Hickman, in a recent
article, demonstrated that the Treasury does not follow the APA
notice and comment rulemaking procedures in over 40 percent of
its rulemakings.24
Likewise, Ashutosh Bhagwat demonstrated that the Federal
Communications Commission (“FCC”) for a decade labeled its
actions in relation to tariffs “enforcement policy” rather than
acknowledging it was rulemaking.25 Using the Chaney doctrine,26
it was therefore able to avoid judicial review until the D.C. Circuit
finally called it on the issue.27
Other studies used analysis rather than empirical methods to
make the same points. For example, one writer claims that
“government has no sense of accountability.”28 Dobkin, focusing
on the Immigration and Naturalization Services, sees agencies as
lacking accountability by acting behind the scenes, which leads to
“lawlessness.”29
These are the type of studies that resonate most powerfully
outside the academic community, mostly because they reflect
stories of abuse that come up in the news and fit the general
American tendency to distrust bureaucrats.
For example, in 2007 the Inspector General of the Department
of the Interior started expressing concerns about the operations of
the Department’s Minerals Management Service, an agency that
collects government royalties from oil companies drilling on public
lands. The Inspector General’s initial concern was that since the
23

Id. at 902–03.
Kristine E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s
(Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking
Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1727, 1748–52 (2007).
25
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Three-Branch Monte, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 157,
168–69 (1996).
26
See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
27
Bhagwat, supra note 25, at 169–70.
28
Malcolm Wallop, The Centralization of Power and Government
Unaccountability, 4 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 487, 487 (1995).
29
Donald S. Dobkin, The Rise of the Administrative State: A Prescription
for Lawlessness, 17 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 362, 367, 385 (2008).
24
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Clinton administration, the agency has allowed oil companies to
underpay.30 Later investigations showed a culture of accepting
gifts from industry representatives, sexual relationships with
representatives from oil and gas companies (and it’s not often you
find an agency literally in bed with the regulated industry), and
abuse of alcohol, cocaine, and marijuana in industry-organized
parties.31 While the newspaper reports treated it as a classic
example of lack of accountability, it should be remembered that it
was an internal administrative control that discovered all this—the
Department of the Interior’s own Inspector General, Earl E.
Devaney—and it was the administrative machine that stepped in to
punish the problem agency.32
The same department’s lack of accountability was severely
criticized during the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. The agency
was criticized for not exercising sufficient oversight over the
operations of British Petroleum (BP), the company owning the
well that spilled over. Once again, the government—specifically,
the Department of the Interior—took corrective steps, and very
extreme ones. The agency was substantially reformed, and the
reforms included a fundamental restructuring. For example, a
royalty-in-kind program subject to many abuses was abolished, an
independent Marine Board was ordered to review the agency’s
inspection program for offshore facilities, and inspections of
deepwater operations were ordered.33
30

Report Reveals Distrust in Royalties Agency, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26,
2007, at A19, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119077573820539
676.html.
31
Stephen Power, Federal Oil Officials Accused in Sex and Drugs Scandal,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2008, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB
122107135333120223.html; Charlie Savage, Sex, Drug Use and Graft Cited in
Interior Department, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2008, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/11/washington/11royalty.html?scp=1&sq=dep
artment%20interior%20orgies%20drugs&st=cse.
32
See Power, supra note 31.
33
See Press Release: Salazar Launches Safety and Environmental
Protection Reforms to Toughen Oversight of Offshore Oil and Gas Operations,
U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR (May 11, 2010), http://www.doi.gov/news/press
releases/Salazar-Launches-Safety-and-Environmental-Protection-Reforms-toToughen-Oversight-of-Offshore-Oil-and-Gas-Operations.cfm (describing the
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Scholars are not the only ones adhering to the “agency as
accountability villains” story. Politicians regularly attack agencies
for their lack of accountability. That, for example, was at the heart
of Representative Elliot Levitas’ strong promotion of the
legislative veto, which would have given Congress control over
agency rules. 34 The same view was at the heart of the new and
vigorous attempts to reintroduce the “Regulations from the
Executive In Need of Scrutiny (REINS) Act” promoted by, for
example, Congressman Geoff Davis, that would require all major
rules to be approved by a Congressional Joint Resolution before
they became operative.35 In a completely different example
Nebraska Democratic Senator Ben Nelson, concerned about money
withheld from the University of Nebraska, described it as
“unaccountable Federal bureaucrats diverting millions of dollars
into agency ‘slush funds.’”36
In the discussions leading to the enactment of the IRS
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998,37 Senator Frank
Murkowski from Alaska said that “[f]ederal agencies tend to act as
if they are a law unto themselves, believing they are accountable to
no one. . . . [T]he system was designed to avoid accountability.”38
The studies of agencies as accountability villains capture an

reforms).
34
BARBARA HINKSON CRAIG, CHADHA: THE STORY OF AN EPIC
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE 149–50 (1990); JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, THE
DECLINE AND RESURGENCE OF CONGRESS 324, 353 (1981).
35
See Congressman Davis’ personal website at CONGRESSMAN GEOFF
DAVIS, http://geoffdavis.house.gov/Legislation/reins.htm (last visited Feb. 24,
2011). The bill itself was presented as H.R. 10 to the 112 Congress. Details can
be found at: H.R. 10– Regulations From the Executive in Need of Security Act of
2011, OPEN CONGRESS, http://www.opencongress.org/bill/112-h10/show (last
visited February 24, 2011).
36
Ron Nixon, Not All Earmarks Are Paid in Full, and a Senator Wants to
Know Why, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2008/05/20/washington/20earmark.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=unaccountable
%20administrative%20agencies&st=cse.
37
Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (1998).
38
IRS Oversight, Hearings Before the Comm. on Fin., 105th Cong. 9
(1998) (statement of Sen. Frank S. Murkowski, Alaska).
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important part of the truth; abuses occur in the administrative
state—some that clearly cannot be justified, such as the behavior
of the Minerals Management Service—but others which might be
looked upon as making the best of a bad situation. There are times
when the only way to get a job done is to bend some rules, given
the complex situations that sometimes face agencies. Consider, for
example, the FDA’s behavior described by Noah, which could be
seen as the only way for the agency to actually get its job done in
the face of severe financial and staffing constraints.39 But this is
not the whole picture.
B. Agencies as Victims
A completely different view of agency accountability
emphasizes the problematic nature of accountability in the
American administrative state, focusing on an alleged excess of
accountability mechanisms. Scholars who take this view do not
deny that there are abuses by agencies.40 However, they suggest
that it is more common to find a well meaning, hard working
administration assailed from all sides by demands and accusations,
so that simply doing its assigned job becomes extremely difficult.
The more neutral of these studies describe the complexity of
the administrative state and address how agencies deal with that
complexity. For example, in their study of public administration,
Romzek and Dubnick offer a classic typology of accountability—
bureaucratic, professional, political, and legal.41 This well-accepted
classification42 distinguishes between types of accountability on
39

Noah, supra note 22, at 902–903.
See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the
Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1398 (1992) [hereinafter McGarity,
Some Thoughts].
41
MELVIN J. DUBNICK & BARBARA S. ROMZEK, AMERICAN PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION: POLITICS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF EXPECTATIONS 77–82
(1991) [hereinafter DUBNICK & ROMZEK, AMERICAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION];
Barbara S. Romzek & Melvin J. Dubnick, Accountability in the Public Sector:
Lessons from the Challenger Tragedy, 47 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 227, 228–29
(1987).
42
For examples of use, see Mark Bovens, Public Accountability, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 182, 185 (Edwin Ferlie,
40
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two dimensions: whether the degree of control exercised by the
accountability holder is high or low, and whether the source of
control is external or internal.
Based on these two dimensions Dubnick and Romzek identify
four possible types of accountability.43 Bureaucratic (also known
as hierarchical) accountability refers to a high degree of control
exercised within the agency or within the executive branch—by
other agencies, the White House, and the President. It is
hierarchical in nature. It includes, but is not limited to, relations
between lower agency officials and higher agency officials.
Professional accountability is internal but involves a low degree of
control—it emphasizes professional norms and reputational
mechanisms to control experts who require discretion to do their
job. Legal accountability involves a high level of control exercised
by an external actor; for agencies, this includes control by courts
and Congress, through legislation or the budget. Finally, political
accountability refers to a low level of control exercised by an
external actor—for example, influence or pressure exerted by
Congress-members, the media, and interest groups. Agencies face
all these forms of accountability simultaneously and have to
respond to them. The science of public administration, say
Dubnick and Romzek, is the science of managing conflicting
expectations.
Similarly, Radin discusses the challenges facing agencies when
they try to deal with the accountability apparatus by examining a
hypothetical new head of the Department of Health and Human
Service and his ability to juggle the conflicting accountability
demands he faces in his new job.44
Hargrove and Glidewell ask how officials deal with
“Impossible Jobs,” where the “clients” (e.g., welfare recipients,
Laurence E. Lynne & Christopher Pollitt eds., 2005); WILLIAM T. GORMLEY JR.
& STEVEN J. BALLA, BUREAUCRACY AND DEMOCRACY: ACCOUNTABILITY AND
PERFORMANCE 11–12 (2004); BERYL A. RADIN, CHALLENGING THE
PERFORMANCE MOVEMENT: ACCOUNTABILITY, COMPLEXITY, AND DEMOCRATIC
VALUES 55–56 (2006).
43
See DUBNICK & ROMZEK, AMERICAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, supra
note 41, at 77–82.
44
RADIN, THE ACCOUNTABLE JUGGLER, supra note 14, at 10–11, 22–24.

REISS - FINAL.DOC

5/9/2011 4:02 PM

Account Me In

625

prisoners) are not considered very sympathetic, and where there is
high conflict among interested constituencies and little confidence
in the profession and the agency.45 There are many other
examples.46
Other studies go further and argue that the intense
accountability pressures agencies face have severe negative
repercussions for the administrative state and the public interest. In
his study of accountability, Behn suggests that the multiplicity of
accountability mechanisms leads agencies to be blamed regardless
of what they do, and that this excess blame can lead to a range of
negative results—from defensive behavior to despair.47
Similarly, Kagan, in his book Adversarial Legalism, tracks the
problematic effects of the decentralized, multilayered system of
government in the United States on making public policy.48 For
example, he describes how the involvement of multiple actors—
several federal and state agencies, as well as federal and state
courts—made the dredging of the Port of Oakland very slow, much
more costly than anticipated, thus costing the city of Oakland jobs
and revenues.49 He acknowledges that adversarial legalism has
benefits—making the system more open to new claims and more

45

ERWIN C. HARGROVE & JOHN C. GLIDEWELL, IMPOSSIBLE JOBS IN
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 5–8 (1990).
46
See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Accountability and Institutional Design:
Some Thoughts on the Grammar of Governance, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY:
DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES, supra note 14, at 115, 120–22;
BERNARD ROSEN, HOLDING GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACIES ACCOUNTABLE
179–204 (3d ed. 1998); Dorit Rubenstein Reiss, Agency Accountability
Strategies After Liberalization: Universal Service in the United Kingdom,
France, and Sweden, 31 L. & POL’Y 111, 113–15 (2009) [hereinafter Reiss,
Agency Accountability]; Dorit Rubinstein, Regulatory Accountability:
Telecommunications and Electricity Agencies in the UK, France and Sweden
(2007) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of California, Berkeley) (on file
with author).
47
BEHN, supra note 14, at 1–6 (discussing the phenomenon); id. at 69–72
(discussing some of the negative impacts).
48
ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF
LAW 43 (2001).
49
To such an extent it became uncertain whether the port would actually be
dredged, costing Oakland’s port further business. Id. at 27–30.

REISS - FINAL.DOC

626

5/9/2011 4:02 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

accessible.50 However, at least when it comes to regulation, Kagan
strongly suggests that the costs of adversarial legalism outweigh
the potential benefits.51
The debate about “ossification” of the rulemaking process is
another example of studies warning against the negative effects of
excess accountability. In a famous and very strongly written
article, Thomas McGarity criticized the complexities added to the
rulemaking process as harmful to the functionality of the
administrative state.52 In a subsequent article, he emphasized that it
is unrealistic to tie agencies’ hands so thoroughly while expecting
them to deliver and be effective.53 He also emphasized that the
extensive accountability used undermines the agencies’ efforts to
protect the public from the harms they were designed to combat.54
Other scholars expressed similar concerns,55 though recent
empirical studies have cast doubts on the extent to which agency
rulemaking is indeed ossified by having too much accountability
forced upon them.56
50

Id. at 31–32.
Id. at 196–204.
52
See McGarity, Some Thoughts, supra note 40, at 1448–59.
53
See Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of
Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 525–26
(1997).
54
Id. at 530–33.
55
See generally Lubbers, The Transformation, supra note 18, at 474–475;
JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY
(1990); E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490 (1992);
Ronald M. Levine, More on Direct Final Rulemaking: Streamlining, Not
Corner-Cutting, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 757 (1999); see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 62–65
(1995).
56
See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An
Empirical Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 932
(2008); William S. Jordan III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and
Capricious Review Significantly Interfere With Agency Ability to Achieve
Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393, 439–
40 (2000); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Administrative
Procedures and Bureaucratic Performance: Is Federal Rule-making
“Ossified”?, 20 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 261, available at http://jpart.
oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/mup011v1.
51
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The common thread that runs through all of these studies is the
idea that agencies, subject to extensive accountability mechanisms,
are often unfairly blamed for problems not of their own making,
serve as politicians and scholars’ whipping boys, and have trouble
doing their jobs. As with the “agencies as villains” narratives, these
studies capture a part of the picture, but ignore another. It is to this
missing link I turn now.
C. Agencies as Accountability Initiators
The part of the picture that current literature underemphasizes
is the role of agencies as sophisticated actors managing their own
accountability environment by creating and adding accountability
mechanisms.
Public administration scholars acknowledge agencies acting
autonomously in other contexts. For example, Carpenter describes
in detail how several agencies created their own autonomous
policies and managed to get the legislation they wanted from
Congress by building a reputation for competence and for
supporting the public interest.57 A focus on agency action or
agency discretion, implicitly acknowledging that agencies have
freedom to act, is at the core of most studies of public
administration and the problem the “agencies as villains” narrative
confronts.58
However, these insights have not been applied to the study of
accountability—i.e., so far agencies have not been treated as
autonomous actors that can create and contribute to their
accountability environment.
One paper that stands out as an exception is Elizabeth Magill’s
57

See generally DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC
AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN
EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862–1928 (2001).
58
For some examples of studies that focus on agency discretion, see GARY
C. BRYNER, BUREAUCRATIC DISCRETION: LAW AND POLICY IN FEDERAL
REGULATORY AGENCIES (Richard A. Brody et al. eds., 1987); JERRY L.
MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW FROM AN INTERNAL
PERSPECTIVE 71–72 (1983); Joel D. Aberbach & Bert A. Rockman, Image IV
Revisited: Executive and Political Roles, 1 GOVERNANCE 1 (1988).
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recent study of self-regulation.59 Magill examines agencies’
voluntary adoption of regulations that limit their discretion.60 She
makes an important contribution to the literature by taking a clear,
unbiased view of agencies’ activities and by emphasizing the
agencies’ role in creating the regulatory environment they operate
in.
Many of the limits agencies adopt through self-regulation may
be seen as reforms that increase accountability—but not all.61 And
since Magill emphasizes, for most of her discussion, selfregulation activities that were actually embedded in agency rules—
which will therefore be enforced by the courts under the Accardi
principle62—some of the efforts agencies make to increase their
accountability are not captured by her discussion, such as the IRIS
system mentioned in the introduction to this Article. More
importantly, her methodology—an analytical discussion—is
dramatically different from the qualitative empirical description
based on case studies used in this Article. Also, her explanations
for why agencies adopt self-regulation focus mostly on what I
describe as “rational choice” explanations, and are therefore more
limited than those used here.63
This Article adds to the literature by suggesting that agencies
also act voluntarily to increase their accountability; moreover, it
provides detailed case studies of such behavior. Agencies do so for
a number of reasons, including their self-interest, but also due to
the power of ideas brought in by appointees from outside the civil
service and to the role conception of the civil servants.
One challenge a claim like this faces is how to define
accountability. The word “accountability” suffers from overuse
and misuse, and scholars have expressed concerns about the term

59

See generally Elizabeth Magill, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 859 (2009).
60
Id. at 861.
61
See infra text accompanying notes 125–32 for examples of reforms that
increase accountability.
62
According to which agencies are bound by their own regulations. Magill,
supra note 59, at 877–81.
63
Id. at 884–91.
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losing its meaning.64 It has been defined as covering electoral
accountability,65 punishment,66 or control of one party by
another.67 Very broadly, cognitive psychology scholars see
accountability as:
[an] implicit or explicit expectation that one may be called
on to justify one’s beliefs, feelings, and actions to
others . . . [It] also usually implies that people who do not
provide a satisfactory justification for their actions will
suffer negative consequences ranging from disdainful looks
to loss of one’s livelihood, liberty, or even life . . . .
Conversely, people who do provide compelling
justifications will experience positive consequences . . . . 68
To solve the problem of defining accountability, I am focusing
my discussion on two types of reforms that agencies often adopt:
increasing their transparency and increasing their responsiveness to
external actors. Increasing transparency is often suggested as a
means of increasing accountability69 and allowing external actors
64

BEHN, supra note 14, at 2–3; Bovens, supra note 42, at 182; Richard
Mulgan, ‘Accountability’: An Ever-Expanding Concept?, 78 PUB. ADMIN. 555,
555–56 (2000); Melvin J. Dubnick, Professor, Rutgers University–Newark,
Seeking Salvation for Accountability, Delivered at 2002 Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association (Aug. 29–Sept. 1, 2002), available at
http://mjdubnick.dubnick.net/papers/2002/salv2002.pdf.
65
See, e.g., KENNETH J. MEIER & LAURENCE J. O’TOOLE, JR.,
BUREAUCRACY IN A DEMOCRATIC STATE: A GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVE 12
(2006); DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW
CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 102–03 (1993); see
generally Wallop, supra note 28.
66
BEHN, supra note 14, at 3.
67
Id. at 14–16.
68
Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of
Accountability, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255, 255 (1999). Although developed in
relation to studies of individuals, the definition has been used in relation to
agencies before. Reiss, Agency Accountability, supra note 46, at 114 n.1; Mark
Seidenfeld, The Psychology of Accountability and Political Review of Agency
Rules, 51 DUKE L.J. 1059, 1064 n.26 (2001).
69
Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV.
1249, 1254 (2008) (grouping transparency with accountability as part of a
whole); Christopher Hood, What Happens When Transparency Meets BlameAvoidance?, 9 PUB. MGMT. REV. 191, 192–93 (2007); Koppell, supra note 14, at
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more of a say increases control, as well as the threat of sanctions.70
Therefore, reforms in which agencies increase their transparency
or the influence of other actors can be taken with some confidence
as examples of efforts to increase accountability.
II. AGENCIES WANT TO BE ACCOUNTABLE
If, as I argue, some agencies want to be accountable, the
question remains, why? This part of the Article suggests some
explanations, which are supported by the case studies detailed in
Part III. I will draw on several strands of literature about the
administrative state, as well as on general features of agencies, and
examine three strong motivators that can create a quest for
accountability within an agency. The first focuses on what we may
term the “rational choice model”—i.e., efforts by an agency to
minimize costs arising out of a successful accusation of lack of
accountability, and to maximize the benefits to itself that derive
from accountability.71 However, other explanations are just as
persuasive; this Article examines two of those alternative
explanations.
One explanation is based on the power of ideas, and
specifically upon agencies’ acceptance of new ideas about the
importance of transparency and participation—ideas drawn from
practitioners, consultants, and scholars which have become
prevalent in the world of governance. The second is based on
agencies’ role conception. This explanation claims that in today’s
world, bureaucrats have internalized the need to be accountable as
part of their mission and role conception, and invest in
accountability as an integral part of doing their job. In a sense,
these explanations overlap, but there is an important difference in
96 (characterizing transparency as a dimension of accountability); May, supra
note 14, at 11–12 (characterizing transparency as increasing accountability).
70
See generally West, supra note 14 (equating participation with
accountability throughout); see also Camilla Stivers, The Listening Bureaucrat:
Responsiveness in Public Administration, 54 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 364, 367 (1994)
(stating that responsiveness to the public promotes accountability).
71
This, for example, is the argument suggested to explain the EPA’s
behavior in Part III.B.
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the “target audience” on which they focus. As the case studies
suggest, ideas are frequently brought into an agency through the
appointment of outsiders. Peter Hutt came to the FDA from private
practice, Richard Merrill from academia, and Charles Rossotti was
a businessman before becoming commissioner of the IRS. All
three were strongly committed to transparency in a way that the
staff may not have been at the time they came in.
However, sometimes separately and sometimes as a response
to the reform, ideas can also be internalized by the agency’s civil
servants, those who run day-to-day operations of the agency. In
that case we are talking about role conception. It’s not just about
the power of the idea itself; the issue becomes the way the civil
servant sees her job, a matter of duty rather than ideology. Even
before the 1998 reform, several of the IRS staff members were
promoting increased transparency; they had, apparently,
internalized the ideas of transparency as part of their role. Even
more striking, after the reforms introduced by Hutt were
implemented, there were some FDA officials who wanted to go
further in transparency than he did. Such occurrences seem to
reflect a redefinition of the officials’ roles in their own minds. All
three of these explanations have some applicability to the case
studies in Part III.
A. Rational Choice: Agencies Want to be Accountable to
Maximize Benefits and Minimize Harm
The rational choice paradigm as it applies to agencies sees
bureaucrats as self-interested utility maximizers.72 The classical
approach posits that bureaucrats seek to maximize their budget.73
However, more recent approaches add in bureaucrats’ desire to
maximize preferred policy outcomes.74
72

See, e.g., CROLEY, supra note 17, at 49; WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR.,
BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 36–38 (1st paperback prtg.
2007). See generally Richard A. Posner, The Behavior of Administrative
Agencies, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 305 (1972).
73
NISKANEN, supra note 72, at 40–41.
74
Sean Gailmard & John W. Patty, Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service,
Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 873, 874
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While there has been substantial criticism of rational choice
theory as not empirically grounded and in tension with the realities
of the administrative state,75 in the context of accountability, there
is some indication in the case studies and in current literature that
agencies do act to increase their accountability because of a costbenefit analysis.
In the last decades governments have suffered from a
legitimacy crisis.76 Trust in government has been dropping
substantially.77 The perception of a legitimacy crisis easily leads to
increased pressure on agencies to be accountable and more and
more efforts are put into holding them accountable. The large
amount of literature on accountability in the last decades78
demonstrates how important the issue has become. In a sense, the
administrative state today is the administrative state under attack.79
In this environment, agencies pay a very high price for an
accusation of lack of accountability that sticks. All the agencies
(2007); Michael M. Ting, The “Power of the Purse” and Its Implications for
Bureaucratic Policy-Making, 106 PUB. CHOICE 243, 245 (2001). Much of the
literature also focuses on the political side of the equation, examining efforts by
political branches to control the administration, treating bureaucrats as having
no say in the design of institutions. See, e.g., John D. Huber & Charles R.
Shipan, The Costs of Control: Legislators, Agencies, and Transaction Costs, 25
LEGIS. STUD. Q. 25, 25–27 (2000); B. Dan Wood & John Bohte, Political
Transaction Costs and the Politics of Administrative Design, 66 J. POL. 176,
179–182 (2004).
75
See, e.g., DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL
CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE, 34–46
(1994); RUTH HOOGLAND DEHOOG, CONTRACTING OUT FOR HUMAN SERVICES
21 (1984); Gary J. Miller & Terry M. Moe, Bureaucrats, Legislators, and the
Size of Government, 77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 297 (1983); Terry M. Moe & Scott
A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure, 57 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 1, 1–2 (1994); Diane Vaughan, Rational Choice, Situated Action, and
the Social Control of Organizations, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 23, 26–27 (1998).
76
THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY AND THE CRISIS
OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY 167–69 (1969). MICHAEL W. DOWDLE, Public Accountability:
conceptual, Historical, and Epistemic Mappings in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS,
DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES 1,1 (Michael W. Dowdle ed., 2006).
77
Kenneth P. Ruscio, Trust, Democracy, and Public Management: A
Theoretical Argument, 6 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 461, 462 (1996).
78
See supra note 14.
79
Rubin, supra note 14, at 74–75.
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described in Part III were agencies under attack, and there are
indications that they tried to increase accountability to reduce
pressure and prevent negative consequences. Claims of lack of
accountability are often raised to justify demands to reform
agencies, cut their budget, change the governing legislation, or
other adverse consequences. For example, the IRS’s reorganization
of 1998 was motivated at least in part by complaints that the IRS
was not sufficiently accountable to Congress.80 Agencies naturally
want to avoid such consequences. At the very least, not being
accountable can mean another actor will add accountability
mechanisms, and as demonstrated in Part I.C, agencies already
face a plethora of them; these demands add work and take up
resources that can be used elsewhere; what sane bureaucrat would
want more of them imposed from the outside?81 No wonder, then,
that administrators and agencies want to demonstrate that they are
accountable and do not fall into the category of “evil,”
unaccountable bureaucrats.
This is the main argument Magill uses in her article; she
describes agency self-regulation as motivated by a rational desire
to increase the benefits to the agency.82 The reasons she suggests
include giving agency heads the ability to control lower officials to
whom they delegate authority;83 clarifying the problem internally
and helping bureaucrats explain their decisions;84 publicizing an
agency’s policy and offering stronger commitment;85 limiting
future changes of policy following a change of administration;86
protecting agency autonomy against intervention from political

80

See generally NAT’L COMM’N ON RESTRUCTURING THE INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., A VISION FOR A NEW IRS (1997).
81
See BEHN, supra note 14, at 14–15. Behn gives the example of the rules
adopted by government procurement officials, observed by scholar Steven
Kelman to add complexity to the process to avoid legal protest or political
challenges. See id. at 15.
82
Magill, supra note 59, at 884–91.
83
Id. at 884–86.
84
Id. at 887.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 888.
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actors;87 and increasing production of collective goods as
information and reputation.88
Some of these reasons apply to agency measures increasing
accountability. Increased accountability can limit the illicit power
of any one actor by forcing the agency to make the basis of its
decisions clear, and thus protect agencies against political
interference. In addition, it may make it harder to change existing
policy; may provide the higher ranks of the agency with more
information about what the rest of the agency is doing; and may
increase its reputation.
B. Pantouflage:89 The Power of Ideas and the Role of Political
Appointees
However, on its own, the cost/benefit argument is insufficient,
for two reasons. First, a strong cost/benefit argument can also be
made that suggests agencies should want to avoid accountability
and not add to the already existing complicated system they face,
an argument commonly made.90 That’s one of the arguments the
“agencies as villains” story draws on. For example, one of Paul
Light’s interviewees said about the desire of Presidential
administrations for a strong inspector general: “Everybody wants a
strong IG operation until it starts investigating them. The
administration may start out thinking they want junkyard dogs and
87

Id. at 889.
Id. at 890–91.
89
The term Pantouflage is taken from studies of French public
administration and refers to the prevalent practice of the senior elite trained in
the most prestigious schools moving back and forth between the public and
private sectors. Luc Rouban, The Administrative and Political Elites, in PASCAL
PERRINEAU & LUC ROUBAN, POLITICS IN FRANCE AND EUROPE 121, 132 (2009).
The United States parallel is that one way to maintain connections and flow of
ideas between the private and public sector is through personnel exchange,
appointing people with previous private sector background to senior positions in
the public service. This is somewhat similar to the United States concept of
“revolving door.”
90
See McCubbins, Administrative Procedures, supra note 16, at 248–49;
see also BEHN, supra note 14, at 15; Dobkin, supra note 29, at 379–82; Hood,
supra note 69, at 192.
88
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what they end up getting is French poodles.”91
Second, while a rational choice explanation may explain why
an agency chooses to work toward increased accountability, it says
nothing about the choice of method. Nor does it explain the level
of commitment some agencies show to the accountability
endeavor. In a world in which government agencies have limited
resources—what has been referred to by some as a period of
austerity92—some agencies devote substantial portions of their
scarce resources to accountability. There is clearly more going on
here than mere protection of self-interest; a more nuanced
explanation would appear to be needed.
One such explanation is the power of ideas. As demonstrated
by B. Guy Peters, current ideas about governance draw on several
extremely important traditions, many of which are connected to
accountability.93 Scholars have demonstrated that ideas can have
strong influence on the behavior of organizations.94 In the case of
91

PAUL CHARLES LIGHT, MONITORING GOVERNMENT: INSPECTORS
GENERAL AND THE SEARCH FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 102 (1993).
92
Paul Pierson, From Expansion to Austerity: The New Politics of Taxing
and Spending, in SEEKING THE CENTER: POLITICS AND POLICYMAKING AT THE
NEW CENTURY 54, 76–77 (Martin A. Levin et al. eds., 2001); Paul Pierson,
Coping with Permanent Austerity: Welfare State Restructuring in Affluent
Democracies, in THE NEW POLITICS OF THE WELFARE STATE, 410, 423–25 (Paul
Pierson ed., 2001); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Judicial Review of Agency Actions in a
Period of Diminishing Agency Resources, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 61, 65–67 (1997)
[hereinafter Pierce, Judicial Review].
93
See B. GUY PETERS, THE FUTURE OF GOVERNING 16–22 (2001)
(demonstrating that among the ideas that shape governance in today’s world are
participation and market-based ideas, including ideas of transparency).
94
See, e.g., MARK BLYTH, GREAT TRANSFORMATIONS: ECONOMIC IDEAS
AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 20–27 (2002)
(reviewing the literature on the power of ideas); JOHN D. CAMPBELL,
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND GLOBALIZATION 17–23 (2004) (citing additional
sources therein); John L. Campbell, Institutional Analysis and the Role of Ideas
in Political Economy, in THE RISE OF NEOLIBERALISM AND INSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS 159, 175–77 (John L. Campbell & Ove K. Pedersen eds., 2001); John
L. Campbell, Institutional Analysis and the Role of Ideas in Political Economy,
27 THEORY & SOC’Y 377 (1998); George Kateb, Ideology and Storytelling, 69
SOC. RES. 321, 321–23 (2002) (observing that ideas are powerful enough to lead
people to do horrible things under totalitarian regimes); Robert C. Lieberman,
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agencies, ideas can also be translated into actual pressures and
changes through politicians, interest groups, and the
administrators’ epistemic community, including those that write
about agencies.
One set of ideas which greatly influences the behavior of
agencies draws upon market ideology and private sector reforms.95
An argument made by supporters of these ideas is that traditional
hierarchical mechanisms of accountability do not work very well;
they argue that market style mechanisms can provide better
accountability and achieve better results.96 Whether or not, as an
empirical matter, market-style reforms do in fact improve
accountability—and there is doubt about that claim97—the idea
Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order: Explaining Political Change, 96 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 697, 699–700 (2003).
95
For example, reforms attempting to introduce ideas current in the private
sector—such as competition, privatization, incentive-based approaches—into
the public sector. See, e.g., JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS,
MARKETS, AND AMERICA’S SCHOOLS (1990); PETERS, supra note 93, at 22–30;
Isabel M. Bjork & Catherine R. Connors, Free Markets and Their Umpires: The
Appeal of the U.S. Regulatory Model, 22 WORLD POL’Y J. 51, 51 (2005); David
Levi-Faur, The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism, 598 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 12 (2005); David Levi-Faur, Regulatory Capitalism:
The Dynamics of Change beyond Telecoms and Electricity, 19 GOVERNANCE
497 (2006).
96
See BEHN, supra note 14, at 37–38; Bjork & Connors, supra note 95, at
52–53; Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116
HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1314–27 (2003); Michael Trebilcock & Edward M.
Iacobucci, Privatization and Accountability, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1422–24.
97
For those raising concerns about the effect of market style reforms on
accountability, see Carol Harlow, Public Service, Market Ideology, and
Citizenship, in PUBLIC SERVICES AND CITIZENSHIP IN EUROPEAN LAW (Mark
Freedland & Silvana Sciarra eds., 1998), GREG PALAST ET AL., DEMOCRACY
AND REGULATION: HOW THE PUBLIC CAN GOVERN ESSENTIAL SERVICES 20–22
(2003) (describing British and Indian transactions in which review and comment
or other public review processes were insufficient and thus unnecessarily
costly), and Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for
the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1260–63 (2003). On the other hand,
there is also a substantial literature supporting the claim. See e.g., STEVEN K.
VOGEL, FREER MARKETS, MORE RULES 17–21 (1996) (incorporating market
forces considerations into a state institutions framework); Scott Furlong,
Political Influences on the Bureaucracy—the Bureaucracy Speaks, 8 J. PUB.
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exists and is powerful, and this belief in the efficacy of the market
can easily drive public servants to try to increase their own
accountability through methods that aim at exploiting the reputed
advantages of the market. Agencies whose work is not easily
privatized or which cannot really compete with the market’s
reputed price discipline may emphasize, instead, more achievable
benefits such as increased information and transparency.98
Many times people appointed to lead agencies have come in
with a strong belief in transparency.99 In the cases described in this
Article, the appointment of Peter Hutt as Chief Counsel of the
FDA, with his belief in transparency, directly influenced the
reforms adopted. In that case, the politically appointed
commissioner was also onboard. In the case of the IRS,
Commissioner Rossotti’s belief in the need for reform and his
continued belief in transparency also advanced the reform.
Yet another set of important ideas that influence modern
agencies relate to increasing public participation and the role of
citizens in government.100 Substantial amounts of scholarship have
promoted the idea of giving citizens more opportunities to
participate, often suggesting new and original modes of doing
so.101 Practical experiments in participatory government have been
ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 39, 48–50 (1998).
98
See COSMO GRAHAM, REGULATING PUBLIC UTILITIES: A
CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACH (2000), for an example of the regulatory agencies
in England trying to increase their legitimacy through transparency.
99
See generally WOOD & WATERMAN, supra note 18; see also Furlong,
supra note 97, at 39.
100
PETERS, supra note 93, at 50–64.
101
See, e.g., 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS §
II (1998); JOHN GASTIL, BY POPULAR DEMAND: REVITALIZING
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY THROUGH DELIBERATIVE ELECTIONS (2000);
PAUL HIRST, ASSOCIATIVE DEMOCRACY: NEW FORMS OF ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL GOVERNANCE 15–43 (1994); ETHAN LEIB, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA: A PROPOSAL FOR A POPULAR BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT (2004);
Sherry R. Arnstein, A Ladder of Citizen Participation, 35 J. AM. INST.
PLANNERS 216 (1969); Ned Crosby et al., Citizens Panels: A New Approach to
Citizen Participation, 46 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 170 (1986); Frank Fischer, Citizen
Participation and the Democratization of Policy Expertise: From Theoretical
Inquiry to Practical Cases, 26 POL’Y SCI. 165 (1993); Judith E. Innes & David
E. Booher, Reframing Public Participation: Strategies for the 21st Century, 5
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conducted.102 The effect of this may have been much greater on
agencies than on Congress or the President. Much attention has
been given to efforts to increase participation in agency
proceedings.103 Just as with market ideology, a good deal of
PLAN. THEORY & PRAC. 419 (2004); Lyn Kathlene & John A. Martin,
Enhancing Citizen Participation: Panel Designs, Perspectives, and Policy
Formation, 10 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 46 (1991); Jennifer Nou,
Regulating the Rulemakers: A Proposal for Deliberative Cost-Benefit Analysis,
26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 601 (2008); Ortwin Renn et al., Public Participation
in Decision Making: A Three-Step Procedure, 26 POL’Y SCI. 189 (1993); Nancy
Roberts, Public Deliberation in an Age of Direct Citizen Participation, 34 AM.
REV. PUB. ADMIN. 315 (2004).
102
See JAMES L. CREIGHTON, THE PUBLIC PARTICIPATION HANDBOOK:
MAKING BETTER DECISIONS THROUGH CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT 18–20 (2005);
Ned Crosby, Citizens Juries: One Solution for Difficult Environmental
Questions, in FAIRNESS AND COMPETITION IN CITIZEN PARTICIPATION:
EVALUATING MODELS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DISCOURSE 157–87 (Ortwin Renn
et al. eds., 1995); Peter C. Deienel & Ortwin Renn, Planning Cells: A Gate to
“Fractal” Mediation, in FAIRNESS AND COMPETITION IN CITIZEN
PARTICIPATION: EVALUATING MODELS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DISCOURSE,
supra, at 117–40 (Ortwin Renn et al. eds., 1995); Archon Fung & Erik Olin
Wright, Thinking About Empowered Participatory Governance, in DEEPENING
DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN EMPOWERED PARTICIPATORY
GOVERNANCE 4–5 (Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright eds., 2003); Gastil, supra
note 101; Carolyn M. Hendriks, Consensus Conferences and Planning Cells:
Lay Citizen Deliberations, in THE DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY HANDBOOK:
STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVE CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY 80–110
(John Gastil & Peter Levine eds., 2005); Carolyn J. Lukensmeyer et al., A Town
Meeting for the Twenty-First Century, in THE DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
HANDBOOK: STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVE CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN THE 21ST
CENTURY, supra, at 154–63; Edward C. Weeks, The Practice of Deliberative
Democracy: Results from Four Large-Scale Trials, 60 Pub. Admin. Rev. 360
(2000).
103
See, e.g., CAROLYN J. LUKENSMEYER & LARS HASSELBLAD TORRES,
PUBLIC DELIBERATION: A MANAGER’S GUIDE TO CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT (2006),
available at http://www.businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/files/Lukens
meyerReport.pdf; Roger C. Cramton, The Why, Where and How of Broadened
Public Participation in the Administrative Process, 60 GEO. L.J. 525 (1972);
Archon Fung, Varieties of Participation in Complex Government, 66 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 66 (2006); Ernest Gellhorn, Public Participation
in Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359, 361 (1972); Ogden, supra
note 18, at 559–67; David Schlosberg et al., Democracy and E-Rulemaking:
Web-Based Technologies, Participation, and the Potential for Deliberation, 4 J.
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criticism has been directed towards these efforts. Quite a lot of this
criticism has been directed at the methods, mostly in relation to
inherent inequalities in the ability to participate and influence,104
but there has also been discussion of the inappropriateness of
participation to certain administrative decisions.105 Even so, the
influence on bureaucrats has been substantial. These ideas enter the
bureaucratic consciousness through training and scholarship, as
well as pressure from political appointees to the agency and from
the White House.
In the cases discussed below in Part III, Hutt’s belief in input
led him to raise the importance of comments by requiring the FDA
to respond to each comment it received. The desire to increase
input evidenced by both the EPA staff and commissioners directly
relates to the style of reforms that were adopted there. At the IRS,
the Taxpayer Advocacy Panel directly increased the role of private
citizens—hopefully representative of “the public”—in decisionmaking. In all three cases, the reforms aimed at increasing
stakeholder participation.

INFO.
TECH.
&
POL.
37
(2007)
available
at
http://people.umass.edu/stu/doc/JITP4-1_
Democracy.pdf.
104
See generally JEFFERY M. BERRY & CLYDE WILCOX, THE INTEREST
GROUP SOCIETY (5th ed. 2009); SIDNEY VERBA & NORMAN H. NIE,
PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA: POLITICAL DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL EQUALITY
(Harper & Row 1972); Marissa Martino Golden, Interest Groups in the RuleMaking Process: Who Participates? Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. PUB.
ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 245 (1998); Janet Newman et al., Public Participation
and Collaborative Governance, 33 J. SOC. POL’Y 203 (2004); Thomas E.
Engram, Liberty, Equality and Fairness: A Study of Citizen Participation in
Federal Agency Rulemaking (April 16, 2008) (unpublised Ph.D. dissertation,
Georgia State University), available at http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/political_
science_diss/4/.
105
Cary Coglianese, Is Consensus an Appropriate Basis for Regulatory
Policy?, in ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES TO
REGUALTORY INNOVATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE (Eric W. Orts &
Kurt Deketelaere eds., 2001) [hereinafter Coglianese, Is Consensus an
Appropriate Basis]; Reiss, Tailored Participation, supra note 20, at 345–46; Jim
Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for
Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173 (1997).
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C. Role Definition: Bureaucrats Expand Their Commitment to
Mission to Include a Commitment to Accountability

An important theme that emerges from the public
administration literature is bureaucrats’ involvement in policy
making106 and bureaucrats’ strong commitment to the mission of
their particular agency.107 Challenging the rational choice view of
the self-interested bureaucrat, a whole line of public administration
studies have suggested that many of those going into the public
service do so because they are motivated to participate in the
making of policy and in achieving policy goals, creating a better
world.108 The most recent line of public administration studies
addressing this, starting in the 1990s, coined the term “Public
Service Motivation.”109 This line of literature used empirical
106

ABERBACH & ROCKMAN, supra note 58, at 8.
See ANTHONY DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 26–84 (Waveland Press
1994) (1966); KENNETH A. SHEPSLE & MARK S. BONCHEK, ANALYZING
POLITICS: RATIONALITY, BEHAVIOR, AND INSTITUTIONS 347–48 (1997); J.
Jonathan Bender et al., Stacking the Deck: Bureaucratic Missions and Policy
Design, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 873 (1987); Gene Brewer et al., Individual
Conceptions of Public Service Motivation, 60 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 254, 255
(2000) [hereinafter Brewer et al., Individual Conceptions]; James L. Perry,
Antecedents of Public Service Motivation, 7 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 181
(1997); James L. Perry, Measuring Public Service Motivation: An Assessment of
Construct Reliability and Validity, 6 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 5, 5–6
(1996) [hereinafter Perry, Measuring Public Service Motivation]; Bradley E.
Wright, Public-Sector Work Motivation: A Review of the Current Literature and
a Revised Conceptual Model, 11 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 559 (2001).
Not all civil servants are devoted to the mission, even under theories that
acknowledge that some are, see DOWNS, supra, at 83, and such devotion does not
always have positive consequences, for example strong bureaucratic loyalty to
one mission may motivate administrators to resist certain changes and tasks. See
Brewer et al, Individual Conceptions, supra note 107, at 261.
108
See JANET V. DENHARDT & ROBERT B. DENHARDT, THE NEW PUBLIC
SERVICE: SERVING, NOT STEERING 3–4 (expanded ed. 2007); John DiIulio,
Principled Agents: The Cultural Bases of Behavior in a Federal Government
Bureaucracy, 4 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 277, 281–82 (1994).
109
See Gene A. Brewer & Sally Coleman Selden, Whistle Blowers in the
Federal Civil Service: New Evidence of the Public Service Ethic, 8 J. PUB.
ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 413, 415–19 (1998); Donald P. Moynihan & Sanjay K.
Pandey, The Role of Organizations in Fostering Public Service Motivation, 67
107
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survey data in an attempt to compare the attitudes and motives of
public servants to those of business executives. It consistently
showed that high level civil servants were more likely to be
motivated by the mission and the public interest than were their
private sector counterparts.110 Not only that, but the studies provide
evidence that suggests that public servants are more motivated by
intrinsic job satisfaction and the opportunity to provide service and
less motivated by financial rewards than their private sector
counterparts;111 that they are more strongly motivated when they
feel their mission is important;112 and their devotion to the public
interest is not limited to their jobs, as they also volunteer more
outside their professional life in terms of both money and time.113
Needless to say, this is a general description and does not describe
all civil servants; at least one study classified public servants
according to their motivation and found some variety.114 But the
trend is clear, and perhaps not surprising—after all, in the United
States, high level public servants usually have a graduate degree,115
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 40, 41 (2007); James L. Perry & Lois Recascino Wise, The
Motivational Bases of Public Service, 50 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 367, 368 (1990).
110
See Brewer & Selden, supra note 109, at 429–33; Philip E. Crewson,
Public-service Motivation: Building Empirical Evidence of Incidence and Effect,
7 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY, 499, 500, 512 (1997); Perry, Measuring
Public Service Motivation, supra note 107, at 6–9, 20–21; Perry & Wise, supra
note 109, at 369-70. One limitation of this literature is that it focuses almost
completely on the upper levels of the civil service, i.e. people in management
positions, and therefore will not tell you much about the motivation of your mail
carrier or customs official; however, the kind of accountability mechanisms
discussed here are usually created at the policy-making level, as the case studies
demonstrate. Thus, the high-level population that this literature describes is
exactly the right one to study for the purposes of the present Article.
111
See Crewson, supra note 110, at 504; Bradley E. Wright, Public Service
and Motivation: Does Mission Matter?, 67 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 54, 54 (2007)
[hereinafter Wright, Public Service and Motivation].
112
See Wright, Public Service and Motivation, supra note 111, at 60.
113
See David J. Houston, ‘‘Walking the Walk’’ of Public Service
Motivation: Public Employees and Charitable Gifts of Time, Blood, and Money,
16 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 67, 73 (2005).
114
See Brewer et al., Individual Conceptions, supra note 107, at 255.
115
B. GUY PETERS, THE POLITICS OF BUREAUCRACY: A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 93–94 (Routledge 5th ed. 2001)(1978). Though less of them come
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but compared to private sector employees they are paid less116 and
certainly enjoy less prestige than managers in private businesses117
or equivalent level civil servants in other countries.118 They face
jobs that are typically very challenging and have relatively less
power than elected officials. Why would anyone take on such work
unless he/she cared deeply about it and the interests it serves?
In today’s world, where accountability is such a strong word, it
is no wonder that certain civil servants accept commitment to
accountability as part of their mission, as the case studies in Part
III reflect. Agencies believe they should be accountable, not just
because they buy into ideas of transparency and participation, but
because it’s part of their role definition: as they view it, one aspect
of doing a good job is to be accountable.119 Accordingly, they are
willing to make efforts and act in ways that will promote
accountability. Furthermore, at least one study demonstrated that
reforms in the public sector could increase the level of public
service motivation, including reforms aimed at increasing
accountability.120
from Ivy League institutions. Id. at 116–17. The Fact Book of the Federal Office
of Personnel Management for 2007 found that since 2000 over sixty percent had
graduate degrees and less than ten percent were not college graduates. U.S.
OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., FEDERAL CIVILIAN WORKFORCE STATISTICS: THE
FACT BOOK 73 (2007 ed.), available at http://www.opm.gov/feddata/
factbook/2007/2007FACTBOOK.pdf. See also Gregory B. Lewis & Sue A.
Frank, Who Wants to Work for the Government?, 62 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 395, 400
(2002) (“[B]etter educated Americans were more likely than others to work for
the government.”).
116
HAL G. RAINEY, UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGING PUBLIC
ORGANIZATIONS 239 (3d ed. 2003); Laura I. Langbein & Gregory B. Lewis,
Pay, Productivity, and the Public Sector: The Case of Electrical Engineers, 8 J.
PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 391, 391–92, 409 (1998).
117
RAINEY, supra note 116, at 327; B. Guy Peters, Searching for a Role:
The Civil Service in American Democracy, 14 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 373, 383
(1993).
118
Joel D. Aberbach & Bert A. Rockman, What Has Happened to the U.S.
Senior Civil Service?, 8 BROOKINGS REV. 35, 35 (1990).
119
James H. Svara, The Myth of the Dichotomy: Complementarity of
Politics and Administration in the Past and Future of Public Administration, 61
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 176, 179 (2001).
120
See generally Moynihan & Pandey, supra note 109.
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In other words, civil servants—bureaucrats—are strongly
motivated to serve the public interest; they will begin to actively
seek increases in transparency and/or responsiveness if and when
they perceive that the public interest calls for that kind of reform.
In a reality that emphasizes accountability, we can expect civil
servants to internalize the idea that accountability is an integral
part of their mission, one that is completely necessary if their job is
to be done well.
Some support for the idea that bureaucrats internalize the need
for increased transparency and responsiveness comes from a recent
survey of bureaucrats’ attitudes to e-rulemaking conducted by
Jeffrey Lubbers, a renowned expert on rulemaking. Aside from his
empirical findings, Lubbers reports on the comments made about
e-rulemaking, many of which were positive. Among the positive
aspects bureaucrats emphasized were the improvement rulemaking
creates in the ability of the public to participate and the
transparency of the process.121 Here are some examples from his
responses:
E-rulemaking is the obvious choice for encouraging public
comment and allowing easy access to records from
anywhere and without risking the loss of original hard
copies.
With more people using the Internet, it seems the right way
to conduct rulemaking and promises to reach more folks
who don’t read the Federal Register.
In addition to reaching older members of society, making
the process available online makes it more likely we will
reach members of Generation X and the Millennium
Generation . . . .
E-rulemaking is better at letting the public know what the
agencies are doing than it is at providing thoughtful input
121

See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, A Survey of Federal Agency Rulemakers’
Attitudes About E-Rulemaking, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 451, 471 (2010).
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into the decisions themselves.
[M]aking agency rulemaking more accessible to the
public . . .
Makes it much easier for the public to see the
comments . . . .122

There were, of course, also negative comments,123 but the
reason given for the positive comments—the increase of access—
supports the claim that many bureaucrats had internalized the need
for public access and accountability.
The level of resources and efforts devoted to accountability
that I have described in the case studies below may or may not
truly indicate an internalization of a desire for accountability by
agency staffs. However, officials of the agencies repeatedly
express the view that the observed actions demonstrate exactly
that. Hutt strongly emphasized how the FDA officials internalized
the need for transparency, to a degree where he felt obliged to say
“stop,” refusing the publication of trade secrets related to new drug
applications because of the negative policy consequences that
would have resulted. In speaking to the IRS’s officials, they too
say many of the staff, especially at the higher levels, internalized
the need to increase transparency.124 In neither case did I conduct a
thorough investigation of the staff to see whether they have,
indeed, internalized the norms; but that is the impression of
important, well informed observers and it is supported by the
efforts devoted to increasing accountability.
III. CASE STUDIES OF AGENCIES SEEKING ACCOUNTABILITY
Through several case studies, this section develops an
argument that agencies seek out ways to be accountable. Showing

122

Id. at 471–72.
See id. at 472–74.
124
Telephone Interview with
confidentiality) (June 24, 2009).
123

IRS

Official

(under

promise

of
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that agencies are willing to add accountability mechanisms is not
hard. Examples are legion. To use a major one, the APA exempts
matters “relating to agency management or personnel or to public
property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts” from rulemaking
procedures.125 On its face, this would mean agencies providing
government benefits are not required to go through notice and
comment. However, again and again, government agencies
dispersing benefits adopted the notice and comment requirements
in their own regulations, without any legal obligation—even
though such adoption subjects them to possible criticism and
facilitates judicial review.126 The Department of Labor adopted
notice and comment procedures when implementing the
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act, saying:
It is the policy of the Secretary of Labor, that in applying
the rulemaking provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act (5 U.S.C. 553), the exemption therein for matters
relating to public property, loans, grants, benefits or
contracts shall not be relied upon as a reason for not
complying with the notice and public participation
requirements thereof . . . .127
Other examples cited by Lubbers in his book on rulemaking
include the Department of Transportation, the Department of
Housing and Urban Development, the Department of Defense, the
Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of
Agriculture, and the Small Business Administration.128 As Part
III.A documents, a self-initiated elaboration and deepening of the
elements of notice and comment was a substantial part of the
reform of the FDA procedures in the 1970s. Courts treat deviations
from these regulations as if they were violations of the notice and
comment procedures in the APA;129 accordingly, an agency

125

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 553(a)(2) (West 2010).
JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 62
(4th ed. 2006) [hereinafter LUBBERS, A GUIDE].
127
29 C.F.R. § 2.7 (1979).
128
See LUBBERS, A GUIDE, supra note 126, at 63 n.60.
129
See, e.g., Rodway v. U.S. Dep’t. of Agric., 514 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir.
1975); see also LUBBERS, A GUIDE, supra note 128, at 63 n.61.
126
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adopting them is at risk of having its work overturned on
procedural grounds or because of not responding to comments—
incurring an increased risk of sanctions.
In another example, before engaging in the rulemaking that
was the subject of the famous Vermont Yankee case,130 the Atomic
Energy Commission (as it was then called) voluntarily adopted
adversarial proceedings, including cross-examinations, even
though those added to the length of proceedings.131
Taking this further, Elizabeth Magill demonstrated that
agencies often engage in self-regulation, regulation limiting their
discretion, providing many examples.132
A few of these were:
[T]he Social Security Administration’s “grid” regulations,
which succeeded in turning the question of whether a party
is disabled into a series of (more) objective questions.133
[T]he Food and Drug Administration’s decision to provide
notice and invite comment on its “guidance documents”
even though the APA would not have required it.134
In the following case studies, I track in more detail some
examples of increased accountability, focusing on three agencies,
in chronological order of the efforts described. The FDA reformed
its procedures to increase transparency and participation in the
1970s, and provides an early case study of such behavior. Since at
least the 1980s, the EPA has been experimenting with new ideas to
increase its accountability. Finally, the IRS, widely held up for
years as an example of complete non-accountability,135 has been
working for over ten years on increasing its transparency and
130

Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S.
519 (1978).
131
Gillian E. Metzger, The Story of Vermont Yankee, in ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW STORIES 124, 134–35 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006).
132
Magill, supra note 59, at 866–69.
133
Id. at 867.
134
Id. at 868.
135
Wm. Brian Henning, Reforming the IRS: The Effectiveness of the
Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 82 MARQ. L.
REV. 405, 405–06, 427 (1999); Joseph J. Thorndike, Reforming the Internal
Revenue Service: A Comparative History, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 717, 769 (2001).
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responsiveness to the general public.
The history of these agencies shows the persistent phenomenon
of agencies seeking to increase their accountability, covering as it
does a span of time that begins in the 1970s (for the FDA cases)
and continues through the 1980s (with the EPA’s efforts) up to the
present (with the FDA and the EPA’s later efforts and the IRS’s
actions). When considering the significance of the following three
case studies, we should note that the subjects of the studies are all
large and important agencies. The IRS is a mammoth agency with
over 100,000 employees spread throughout the country, and its
actions affect the lives of almost every citizen and resident. The
FDA and the EPA likewise work in areas that directly affect the
quality of life of most citizens of the United States, regulating,
between them, food, air quality, water quality, medicine, and other
areas. These are bodies whose actions have great effect upon
United States public policy.
A. The Efforts of the FDA to Increase its Accountability
In the 1960s and 1970s dramatic procedural changes were
imposed on agencies. In 1966 Congress adopted the Freedom of
Information Act (“FOIA”) requiring that governmental information
be made public unless it fit into one of the exceptions in the Act.136
In the 1970s, the D.C. Circuit required that agencies respond to the
major issues raised in comments137 and emphasized that the basis
of a decision must be clearly explained.138 But even as the D.C.
136

Today it is codified as 5 U.S.C. § 552.
See Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 547
F.2d 633, 646 (D.C. Cir. 1976):
An agency need not respond to frivolous or repetitive comment it
receives. However, where apparently significant information has been
brought to its attention, or substantial issues of policy or gaps in its
reasoning raised, the statement of basis and purpose must indicate why
the agency decided the criticisms were invalid.
See also Portland Cement Ass’n v. Rucklehause, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
138
See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 462 F.2d 846, 849–
50 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
137
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Circuit started its quest to control rulemaking,139 certain agencies
started adopting similar requirements on their own, increasing their
accountability voluntarily. This section describes one such story,
that of the FDA, and examines two sets of efforts: the FDA’s work
to increase its transparency by internalizing the values in the
FOIA140 and the FDA’s procedural reform, both of which occurred
during the same time period (early to mid 1970s) and reflected the
same spirit of increasing transparency and participation.
1. Efforts to Increase Implementation of FOIA
Criticisms of the weakness of FOIA implementation were
common in the early 1970s for agencies generally, and the FDA
was no exception; several specific criticisms of it were made.141
Historically, the FDA, like other agencies, produced minimal
compliance, releasing information only sparsely and reluctantly.
This was a defense mechanism against criticism: “[I]f the public
doesn’t get information, they have a difficult time objecting to
what FDA does.”142 That changed in 1972.
When Peter Barton Hutt was appointed as Chief Counsel for
the FDA in 1971, the importance of improving the agency’s
transparency was impressed on him both by his predecessor,
William H. Goodrich, and by the then Commissioner, Charles C.
Edwards. The mandate fit in with Hutt’s own philosophy. Hutt
139

See, e.g., Reuel E. Schiller, Rulemaking’s Promise: Administrative Law
and Legal Culture in the 1960s and 1970s, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1139, 1155–66
(2001) (citing examples).
140
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West 2010).
141
See Jeremy R. T. Lewis, FOIA and the Emergence of Federal
Information Policy in the 1980s and 1990s, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC
INFORMATION SYSTEMS 41, 42 (G. David Garson ed., 2000); Ralph Nader, New
Opportunities for Open Government: The 1974 Amendments to the Freedom of
Information Act and the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 25 AM. U. L. REV. 1,
3–4 (1975); Kenneth D. Salomon & Lawrence H. Wechsler, Freedom of
Information Act: A Critical Review, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 150, 155–56, 159–
60, 163 (1969–1970); Ralph Nader, Freedom from Information: The Act and the
Agencies, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 2 (1970).
142
Telephone Interview with Peter Barton Hutt, formerly Chief Counsel,
FDA, currently Senior Counsel, Covington & Burling LLP (June 20, 2009).
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viewed transparency as an important accountability mechanism,
one that should be put in place:
My personal philosophy is that full disclosure to the public
is the essence of democracy. . . . if the public doesn’t
understand what’s going on in government, government
can hide all forms of mischief and injustice. Whereas if
everything is made public government has someone
looking over their shoulder—sunlight kills a lot of
issues.143
His first weeks on the job were devoted to determining how the
FDA should comply with FOIA in a way that would increase its
transparency.144 He used his substantial discretion in implementing
the mandate he received to create a solid framework, categorizing
each document and creating a set of rules regarding its disclosure.
He met every Friday with a team consisting of the FDA
Commissioner and other senior officials in the FDA, keeping them
informed and on board, and providing them a chance for input into
the process. While the work was Hutt’s, the policy was endorsed
and supported by the agency’s heads, all of whom at least
accepted, if not actually endorsed, the need for increased
transparency. Richard Merrill, Hutt’s successor as Chief Counsel,
explained that, “Hutt did the major job of convincing the main
people in the agency—the ones I refer to as our client—people
responsible for substantive programs.”145
The result was a proposed rule published in the Federal
Register on May 5, 1972.146 The rule spread over ten of the
Register’s small-print, three-column pages, and included
substantial details. In the preamble to the rule, the Commissioner,
signing the proposed rule, expressed his commitment to FOIA’s
basic premise that “public disclosure should be the rule rather than
the exception.”147
143

Id.
Id.
145
Telephone Interview with Richard A. Merrill, formerly Chief Counsel,
FDA, currently Professor of Law, Emeritus, Virginia Law School (July 7, 2009).
146
Public Information, 37 Fed. Reg. 9128 (May 5, 1972).
147
Id.
144
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That does not mean every piece of information the agency had
was disclosed. The most notable exception was in relation to New
Drug Applications (“NDAs”), and information containing trade
secrets submitted with them. When submitting an application to
license a new drug, a company has to submit substantial amounts
of information to demonstrate the drug’s safety and efficacy,148
much of which it would not want its competitors to know. Trade
secret confidentiality is preserved under at least three legal
sources: Section 552(b)(4) of FOIA (permitting confidentiality),149
the Trade Secrets Act (prohibiting disclosure of trade secrets by
federal officials),150 and section 331(j) of the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (prohibiting the revealing of trade secrets to anyone
outside the department other than the courts or Congress).151 Hutt
decided that the strong prohibitions on disclosing trade secrets, as
well as longstanding agency precedent, supported a restrictive
approach to disclosing materials attached to NDAs, under which
the supporting materials would remain confidential.152 However, to

148

James M. Beck & Elizabeth D. Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use, and
Informed Consent: Debunking Myths and Misconceptions, 53 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 71, 75–76 (1998).
149
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(4) (West 2010)
(“This section does not apply to matters that are . . . trade secrets and
commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or
confidential.”).
150
Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1905 (West 2010):
Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States or of any
department or agency thereof, . . . publishes, divulges, discloses, or
makes known in any manner or to any extent not authorized by law any
information coming to him in the course of his employment or official
duties . . . which information concerns or relates to the trade secrets . . .
shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned not more than one year, or
both; and shall be removed from office or employment.
151
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.A. § 331(j) (West 2010):
The following acts and the causing thereof are prohibited; . . .
revealing, other than to the Secretary or officers or employees of the
Department, or to the courts when relevant in any judicial proceeding
under this chapter, any information acquired . . . concerning any
method or process which as a trade secret is entitled to protection . . . .
152
Telephone Interview with Peter Barton Hutt, supra note 142.
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preserve the public’s right to know and in the interest of
transparency, the agency published summaries of the reasoning
and materials behind a decision—a Summary of Basis of Approval
(“SBA”).153 This decision was arrived at through a consultation
between Hutt and Richard Crout, head of the Bureau of Drugs, in
which Crout agreed that the SBA was a reasonable compromise
between protecting trade secrets and assuring transparency. It was
criticized by industry members who saw the SBA as disclosing too
much information154 and by consumer interest groups for not
providing enough information.155 But it was clearly an effort by the
agency to go beyond its previous practices and increase its
transparency beyond what was mandated under FOIA, as the
agency interpreted it.
It took over two years to finalize the FDA’s public information
rule (which is not unusual—a recent study found that the average
time for rules from notice to final rule is 2.2 years156), and during
that time the agency received 667 letters, including 68 substantive
comments to the rule (which the final regulation answered in

153

Id.; Robert M. Halperin, FDA Disclosure of Safety and Effectiveness
Data: A Legal and Policy Analysis, 1979 DUKE L.J. 286, 287 n.9 (1979).
154
Halperin, supra note 153, at 287; James T. O’Reilly, Implications of
International Drug Approval Systems on Confidentiality of Business Secrets in
the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 123, 128–31 (1998).
155
Judith Axler Turner, Consumer, Report/FDA Pursues Historic Role
Amid Public, Industry Pressures, 1975 NAT’L J. REPS 250, Feb. 15, 1975, at
250, 254 (on file with author). For a more recent example of the same criticism,
a known consumer rights advocate on health matters, Dr. Sidney Wolfe, a
member of the consumer watchdog group Public Citizen, said in response to the
FDA’s creation of a task force to increase transparency in 2009:
For something like 36 years, through litigation and every other means,
we have been trying to expand access to data on drug safety and
efficacy . . . To make access to clinical trial data [happen] much sooner
is a great idea for the public, for everyone that’s involved. . . . It’s antiscientific and anti-intellectual to have these important data secret.
Steven Reinberg, FDA to Study Ways to Be More Open with Public,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS WEEK (June 2, 2009, 4:00 PM), http://www.business
week.com/lifestyle/content/healthday/627708.html; see also Halperin, supra
note 153, at 287.
156
West, supra note 14, at 69.
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detail).157 However, the change in policy was implemented
immediately, without waiting for the regulations to be finalized,
although it was changed somewhat as a result of the comments
received.158
The regulations that the FDA promulgated between 1972 and
1974 had a dramatic impact on the FDA’s FOIA practice: before
the regulations, the FDA granted only about 10 percent of FOIA
requests submitted to it; after them, it granted about 98 percent.159
The agency seemed to have internalized and bought into the new
and expansive approach to transparency. In fact, Hutt describes
how agency staff wanted to go further than he thought appropriate
on certain issues:
[Agency staff] . . . feel conflicted on safety and
effectiveness data. They get so much criticism for not
releasing it from people who don’t understand that that’s
confidential trade secret, and they want to just release it—
and get rid of the criticism. But you have to understand the
consequences—releasing all trade secrets will destroy the
American pharmaceutical industry. 160
The goal of this increased transparency, as stated by Peter Hutt,
was to increase public scrutiny of the FDA’s actions with a view to
allowing the public to prevent abuses. Critics continued to
challenge the FDA on grounds that it still has not done enough;161
but the agency, in this case, acted with the goal of increasing
accountability. Nor was this the last time the FDA acted to increase
its transparency, though the later examples are beyond the scope of
this project.162
157

Public Information, 39 Fed. Reg. 44602 (December 24, 1974).
Telephone Interview with Peter Barton Hutt, supra note 142.
159
Halperin, supra note 153, at 286.
160
Telephone Interview with Peter Barton Hutt, supra note 142.
161
E.g., Louis P. Garrison, Jr. et al., Assessing A Structured, Quantitative
Health Outcomes Approach To Drug Risk-Benefit Analysis, 26 HEALTH AFFAIRS
684, 685 (2007).
162
More recently, the agency created a task force dedicated to increasing its
transparency and a “transparency blog” dedicated to following the agency’s
efforts to increase its transparency and allowing the public to comment. See
About This Blog, FDA TRANSPARENCY BLOG (Nov. 10, 2008), http://fda
158
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2. Procedural Reform
Today’s administrative law is marked by complex procedures
and substantial demands on agencies. To avoid having their
decisions labeled “arbitrary and capricious,”163 agencies must
explain their actions in the “concise general statement” demanded
by the APA164 and must respond to the comments they received.165
In fact, in today’s world, the multitude of requirements for
explanations by agencies are criticized more often than not.166 But
there was a time when the requirement of explaining an agency’s
action was new and exciting. So when the FDA adopted a set of
procedural regulations that required extensive information to be
provided in a rule’s preamble, it was ahead of its time in imposing
these requirements on itself to increase its accountability.
The background to the procedural reform was a period of
divided government, with President Richard Nixon in the White
House until 1974, followed by Gerald Ford, both Republicans
facing a Democratic Congress.167 The democrats in Congress were
wary of the FDA, and kept a close eye on it, repeatedly criticizing

transparencyblog.fda.gov/about-this-blog.html.
163
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2)(A) (West 2010).
164
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 553(c) (West 2010).
165
MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS?: JUDICIAL CONTROL
OF ADMINISTRATION 47–48 (1988); Ronald M. Levin, Scope-of-Review Doctrine
Restated: An Administrative Law Section Report, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 239, 263
(1986); R. Shep Melnick, Administrative Law and Bureaucratic Reality, 44
ADMIN. L. REV. 245, 246–47 (1992).
166
SHAPIRO, supra note 165, at 47–48; Melnick, supra note 165, at 246–47;
Pierce, Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, supra note 55, at 68–69.
167
In 1971–1973, the House of Representatives members were split
between 255 Democrats and 180 Republicans and the Senate had 54 Democrats
and 44 Republicans (and one conservative and one independent); in 1973–1975
there were 242 Democrats and 192 Republicans in the House, and 56 Democrats
and 42 Republicans in the Senate (and one conservative and one independent).
House History, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
http://clerk.house.gov/art_history/house_history/index.html (last visited Feb. 5,
2011) (giving House membership); Party Division in the Senate, 1789–Present,
U.S. SENATE, http://senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one_item_and_teasers/party
div.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2011) (giving Senate membership).

REISS - FINAL.DOC

654

5/9/2011 4:02 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

its actions and demanding explanations from officials.168 In an
effort to increase the agency’s legitimacy and reduce Congress’
concerns, Hutt undertook to reform the agency’s procedures,169
implementing what were innovations at the time, though these
rules would later become a staple of administrative law.
The change was perhaps most extreme in relation to
rulemaking. Like many other agencies, the FDA initially used
adjudications as its main mode of decision-making. However, as
the agency’s authority was expanded by Congress, mounting
pressures of workload made this inefficient, and the agency
increased its use of rulemaking in the early 1960s.170 One of Hutt’s
major projects was to guide the implementation of the change to an
agency that works primarily through rulemaking.171 This change fit
with the general trend towards increased rulemaking in the 1960s–
1970s,172 fueled in part by concerns about the administrative state’s
accountability—rulemaking was seen as more “sleek, efficient and
fair” compared to the slowness, uncertainty, and potential
arbitrariness inherent to agency adjudication.173
However, rulemaking as the FDA implemented it did not look
like rulemaking as today’s administrative scholars describe it.174
Instead, rulemaking included a short notice including the proposed
regulation (and the other minimal information required by the
APA),175 and after the comments had been submitted, the agency
would publish the final rule with a statement that “having
considered the comments, I [i.e., the commissioner] hereby
168

Telephone Interview with Peter Barton Hutt, supra note 142.
Id.
170
See Schiller, supra note 139, at 1148–49.
171
Telephone Interview with Peter Barton Hutt, supra note 142.
172
See Schiller, supra note 139, at 1145–52.
173
Id. at 1140–41; see also Pierce, Seven Ways to Deossify Agency
Rulemaking, supra note 55, at 59 (elaborating on the benefits of agency
rulemaking).
174
Though it probably looked more like the process anticipated and
designed by the drafters of the APA. See Schiller, supra note 139, at 1159.
175
See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 553(b) (West 2010)
(requiring time, place and nature of public rulemaking proceedings, if any,
reference to legal authority for the rule, either terms of rule or description of
subjects and issues involved).
169
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promulgate the final regulation.”176
Under the same rationale of increasing transparency to increase
agency accountability and reduce abuses, Hutt implemented two
related innovations. First, he required the agency to have a detailed
preamble both in the proposed rule177 and in the final rule.178 The
preamble would have to include:
[A] summary first paragraph describing the substance of
the document in easily understandable terms, . . . (vii)
supplementary information about the regulation in the body
of the preamble that contains references to prior notices
relating to the same matter and a summary of each type of
comment submitted on the proposal and the
Commissioner’s conclusions with respect to each. The
preamble is to contain a thorough and comprehensible
explanation of the reasons for the Commissioner’s decision
on each issue.179
In short, it called for a great deal of information to be produced
by the agency.
The reform was not universally welcomed by agency staff:
“People at FDA were at first blush horrified,” but Hutt was not
deterred. “[This] was a form of transparency. We told the
American public, ‘this is why we are doing it.’”180 The courts’ first
steps into requiring explanation, occurring at the time, assisted
Hutt, and his successor Merrill, to convince the agency that the
steps were necessary.181
In addition, the preamble was to include the commissioner’s
response to the comments submitted, as described in the regulation
above, preempting the demands the courts would later apply to the
FDA. That is not to say that the agency always responded to
comments to the satisfaction of commentators and/or the courts. In

176
177
178
179
180
181

Telephone Interview with Peter Barton Hutt, supra note 142.
21 C.F.R. § 10.40(b)(vii).
Id. § 10.40(c)(3).
Id.
Telephone Interview with Peter Barton Hutt, supra note 142.
Telephone Interview with Richard A. Merrill, supra note 145.
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the Nova Scotia case, for example,182 the court criticized the
FDA’s commissioner for not responding to certain issues raised
directly by the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries of the Department
of the Interior.183 But the agency took steps to increase its
accountability, even though that added substantial work and at the
same time increased the risk that its actions would be challenged.
B. The EPA Works at Being Accountable
Like the FDA, the EPA engaged in many efforts to increase its
accountability. And just as with the FDA, this Article will focus on
only a small sample of these behaviors. The laws governing the
EPA were designed to promote accountability through the “fire
alarm” approach discussed by the trio of scholars collectively
known as “McNollgast.” When using a fire alarm approach
Congress creates accountability mechanisms that allow private
citizens to take action to challenge or block agency deviation from
Congressional mandates, rather than having only “top-down”
oversight.184 Many of the statutes delegating power to the EPA
include provisions for citizen lawsuits.185 One source estimated
that in the 1980s, about 80 percent of the EPA’s rules were subject
to litigation, and described the EPA as “embattled and embroiled
in litigation, threats of litigation and expressions of general
dissatisfaction on the part of all of its outside constituencies—
industry, environmentalists, and state government.”186
In an effort to reduce the dissatisfaction with its programs and
182

See generally United States v. Nova Scotia Food Products Corp., 568
F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977).
183
Id. at 248.
184
Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight
Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 173–76
(1984).
185
For example, the Clean Water Act provision allowing anyone who is or
might be affected by violation of the act’s provision to sue a violator. See Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365 (West 2010). The Clean Air Act has a similar
citizen suit provision. See Clean Water Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7604 (West 2010).
186
Deborah S. Dalton, Negotiated Rulemaking Changes EPA Culture, in
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION DESKBOOK 135, 146
(Marshall J. Breger et al. eds., 2001).
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to increase its legitimacy, the EPA has engaged in many efforts to
increase its accountability by increasing its transparency and the
opportunities for public participation, sometimes through its own
initiatives and sometimes following political prodding. Since at
least the 1980s, the EPA has made substantial efforts to engage the
public in dialogue and increase the input of stakeholders. It
expresses commitment to accountability in the reports describing
its performance and measuring goal achievements. For example,
the agency says in its 2008 “Performance and Accountability
Report”187 that the report “demonstrates EPA’s commitment to be
held accountable for results.”188 In its “Framework for
Implementing EPA’s Public Involvement Program,”189 the EPA
explained that its goal is “to have excellent public involvement
become an integral part of EPA’s culture, thus improving all of the
Agency’s decision making.”190
Many examples can be provided, but this Article will describe
just three in chronological order: adoption of negotiated
rulemaking, the development of the IRIS system, and the 2001
online dialogue.
1. Negotiated Rulemaking
Starting in 1983 the EPA voluntarily conducted a pilot program
of negotiated rulemaking procedures following a recommendation
by the Administrative Conference of the United States; it was one
of the first agencies to do so.191 The Negotiated Rulemaking Act192
187

U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT (2008), available at http://www.epa.gov/planandbudget/archive.html.
188
Id. at 2.
189
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLEMENTING EPA’S
PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT POLICY (May 2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/
publicinvolvement/policy2003/framework.pdf.
190
Id. at 1.
191
Siobhan Mee, Negotiated Rulemaking and Combined Sewer Overflows
(CSOs): Consensus Saves Ossification?, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 213, 232
(1997) (suggesting EPA was the first). But see Cary Coglianese, Assessing
Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE
L.J. 1255, 1263 (1997) [hereinafter Coglianese, Assessing Consensus]
(demonstrating the FAA was the first, with the EPA and a few other agencies
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was only enacted in 1990, at least partly drawing on the EPA’s
experience.193 The EPA chose negotiated rulemaking in an effort to
reduce the adversarial nature of the regular rulemaking process and
especially the litigation that accompanies it, but the choice also
reflects the increasing acceptance of negotiation as a form of
decision making in the environmental context.194
Two initial negotiations on nonconformance penalties under
the Clean Air Act and the criteria for emergency pesticide handling
successfully ended in a consensus that was used in issuing the
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.195 Participants expressed
satisfaction with the process.196 This initial success spurred the
agency to engage in further negotiated rulemaking.
The EPA engaged in a very systematic effort, creating a project
staff that was devoted to identifying appropriate rules for
negotiated rulemaking, monitoring and evaluating facilitators, and
generally improving the process.197 Since 1990, the project’s role
was redefined to include general conflict resolution mechanisms.198
By 2000, the EPA had conducted twenty-one negotiated
rulemakings, more than other agencies, on a wide range of
topics.199 It engaged in many more evaluations to see whether
certain rulemakings were appropriate for negotiated rulemaking.200
While the evaluation of negotiated rulemaking is mixed,201 the
shortly following).
192
Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C. § 561 (West 2010).
193
Mee, supra note 191, at 216.
194
Daniel J. Fiorino & Chris Kirtz, Breaking Down Walls: Negotiated
Rulemaking at EPA, 4 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 29, 29 (1985).
195
Id.
196
Id. at 30.
197
Dalton, supra note 186, at 135, 146–49.
198
Id. at 151–52.
199
Id. at 135. For some descriptions, see id. at 135–46.
200
Id. at 151.
201
Compare Dalton, supra note 186, at 149; Philip J. Harter, Assessing the
Assessors: The Actual Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 32, 33 (2000) [hereinafter Harter, Assessing the Assessors]; Philip J. Harter,
Fear of Commitment: An Affliction of Adolescents, 46 DUKE L.J. 1389, 1421–22,
1422 n.117 (1997); Cornelius M. Kerwin & Scott R. Furlong, Time and
Rulemaking: An Empirical Test of Theory, 2 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY
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EPA made a clear effort to engage stakeholders in its decision
making.
2. The Integrated Risk Information System Database
The EPA’s Integrated Risk Information System database
(IRIS) is, as described at the beginning of this paper, a database
including assessment of the risks involved with various chemicals.
IRIS was adopted by the EPA in 1985, but the major efforts at
reforming its procedures started in the mid 1990s.202
After a 1997 review process, the EPA introduced several
changes which included, for example, creating a hotline for users,
publishing an annual agenda specific to IRIS assessments in the
Federal Register, publishing external peer review drafts of IRIS
assessments on its website and considering public comments on
the drafts.203 In 2004 the agency also added, at the request of the
Office of Management and Budget in the White House (“OMB”), a
process that allows OMB and other federal agencies to review and
comment on assessments; OMB involvement increased over the
years.204 Adding the OMB process was controversial and critics
attacked it on several grounds. It was seen as adding a political
element to what should be a professional endeavor.205 It was seen
as an effort by the Bush administration to add delays to the
assessment process, as part of a pro-business agenda, since the
assessment process is a first step in regulating a given chemical.
However, allowing the OMB to review the EPA documents
113, 122–24 (1992) (giving positive evaluations), with Coglianese, Assessing
Consensus, supra note 191, at 1309–10 (asserting that negotiated rulemaking is
not shorter and has no less litigation than regular rulemaking); id. at 1281–1304
(analyzing the data). See also Cary Coglianese, Assessing the Advocacy of
Negotiated Rulemaking: A Response to Philip Harter, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 386,
405–27 (2000-2001) (offering a much more pessimistic assessment) [hereinafter
Coglianese, Assessing the Advocacy].
202
U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 2, at 6–10.
203
Id. (taken almost, though not completely, verbatim from the report).
204
Id. at 12, 22–23.
205
E.g., OMB WATCH, OMB INTERFERES IN IRIS ASSESSMENTS OF TOXIC
CHEMICALS: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (May 2008), http://ombwatch.org/
files/regs/PDFs/IRISfactsheet.pdf.
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increases accountability in two ways: it provides another layer of
inter-executive branch review, that is, another layer of bureaucratic
accountability, and since OMB is subject to presidential control,
this procedure tends to strengthen the President’s control over
other agencies. Since the President is the only official in the
executive branch directly elected, strengthening his control over
the administrative state strengthens political control over the
professional civil service, thus strengthening at least one type of
accountability.
By 2007, the IRIS assessment process involved the following
stages:206
1. Before assessing a substance, the EPA would ask the public
and other federal agencies or interested parties for
nominations.
2. The EPA would list which of the nominated substances
would be assessed, and publish that list in their annual
agenda, at the same time soliciting scientific information
about the listed substances, both from the public and other
federal agencies.
3. The EPA would also do its own literature search and create a
literature review.
4. The EPA would do a quantitative toxological review.
5. OMB would review the toxological report and distribute it to
other agencies for comment. According to the General
Accountability Office (“GAO”) report, “OMB informs
EPA when EPA has adequately addressed interagency
comments.”207
6. The EPA would publish the results of the toxicological
review and convene a public meeting of external peer
reviewers.
206

This description is based on a combination of the GAO report 08-440,
see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 2, at 13, and a descriptive
article from the non profit OMB Watch that makes a clear distinction between
the process as it was before the 2008 reform described below and the post-2008
process. See White House Gains Influence in Toxic Chemical Assessments, OMB
WATCH (April 15, 2008), http://www.ombwatch.org/node/3642.
207
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 2, at 13.
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7. After external review, the EPA would revise the assessment
as necessary.
8. A second OMB review would then be conducted, with OMB
again disseminating the information to other agencies.
9. Finally, the EPA would post the assessment on its website.
In 2008 this process was strongly criticized by the GAO as too
long and inefficient, but it certainly has substantial accountability
built in, most of which was voluntarily taken on by the agency
(though adding the OMB review seemed to be due to political
pressure).208
On April 10, 2008, the EPA changed its process, adding
several steps. The new steps substantially increased OMB’s role in
the process as well as the opportunity for public comment. For
example, at the selection phase, in addition to asking the public for
nominations of chemicals, the EPA was required to consult with
OMB after receiving nominations to determine which of the
substances nominated it would evaluate. Before creating its
toxological review, the EPA would prepare a qualitative
assessment of the chemical, including potential health risk,
susceptible populations, and potential uncertainties. This
assessment would then be open to comments from the public and
OMB (which would provide the assessment to other agencies). In
addition, if another agency demonstrated the chemical to be critical
to its mission, that agency could require further study of the
substance.209 In other words, the process, while adding to the delay
criticized by the GAO, allowed for increased accountability of the
process towards the OMB and other agencies as well as increased
opportunities for public input.
In May 2009, the EPA’s administrator revised the process once
again, announcing the change in a memo to top EPA officials that
was also published on the agency’s website.210 The goal of the new
process was to streamline and simplify the review process. OMB

208

Id. at 3–5.
White House Gains Influence in Toxic Chemical Assessments, supra
note 206.
210
Memorandum from Lisa P. Jackson, supra note 6.
209
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would now review only at two stages, before and after the input of
the expert peer review. The agency announced that it would lead
the new process (previously, the process was coordinated and
managed by OMB)—the EPA would give the other agencies
opportunity to comment and will meet with them, but it intends to
have the final say.211 Other agencies will no longer be able to delay
the process to conduct research on “mission critical” chemicals.212
In addition, all written comments from other agencies and the
White House were to be made public.213
On the one hand, the agency made substantial efforts to reduce
delays, but on the other hand it increased accountability to the
public by providing more information on its decision-making
process. Generally speaking, throughout all the reforms, the EPA
struggled to balance thorough review of the assessment process
with efficiency, sometimes leaning more one way, sometimes more
the other; but in all cases, it worked hard to increase
accountability, primarily by increasing the input of external actors
and thus giving them more opportunities to impact the final
decision.
3. The Online Dialogue
In 2001, the EPA engaged in an online dialogue to supplement
traditional hearings for comment on its “Draft Public Involvement
Policy” (PIP) and on ways that it could be implemented.214 The
fact that the EPA conducted such a dialogue at all evidences their
search for ways to become more accountable; the content of the
dialogue provides additional evidence that the agency was actively
211

Id. at 4.
EPA Announces New IRIS Assessment Development Process, ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, (May 21, 2009), http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/
48f0fa7dd51f9e9885257359003f5342/065e2c61afea0917852575bd0064c9db!O
penDocument.
213
Memorandum from Lisa P. Jackson, supra note 6.
214
Thomas C. Beierle, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, DEMOCRACY ONLINE: AN EVALUATION OF THE NATIONAL DIALOGUE ON PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT
IN EPA DECISIONS 15 (Jan. 2002), http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-RPTdemonline.pdf.
212
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trying to improve its accountability.
The 2001 dialogue involved 1,166 members of the public and
substantial numbers of the EPA staff. 215 The process started with
the circulation of a draft of the PIP for comments in December
2000.216 The process was open to anyone, and the EPA engaged in
substantial efforts to advertise it. Quoting from Beirle, the author
of a report on the dialogue:
EPA staff sent announcements via EPA mailing lists and
listservs and spread the word through personal contacts and
mailings to a wide variety of institutions involved in
environmental
policy,
including
environmental
organizations, state and local governments, small
businesses, and tribal groups. Internally, they distributed
information to 1,500 EPA staff—including all coordinators
of environmental justice, tribal, communications, and
community-based environmental protection programs—
with a request to pass on information about the Dialogue to
their regular contacts. Information Renaissance publicized
the Dialogue through information channels it had
developed through previous on-line dialogues. Some
people who received announcements about the Dialogue
forwarded them through their own networks.217
About a month before the dialogue, people could register,
either as active or passive participants. (“Active” meant one was
allowed to both read and post messages, “passive” meant reading
privileges only.)218 There was a dialogue website where the EPA
and Information Renaissance posted an electronic briefing book
with substantial amounts of materials.219
Ten of the EPA’s offices held a day of discussion each.
Participants could post messages or answer previous messages in a
215

Id. at 8; Patricia A. Bonner et al., Bringing the Public and the
Government Together Through On-Line Dialogues, in THE DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY HANDBOOK: STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVE CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN
THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 102, at 146–47.
216
BEIERLE, supra note 214, at 15.
217
Id. at 16.
218
Id. at 17.
219
Id. at 18.
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thread.220 Officials responded to “something [sic] that was relevant
to their programs.”221 The material collected was included in the
EPA brochures222 and in a Public Involvement Policy issued in
June 2003.223 A report was prepared after the fact describing the
process in detail.224
In these three very different examples, the EPA constantly
strove to increase input from stakeholders into the process and to
increase the transparency of the process. In the IRIS case, at least,
the costs of accountability may have outweighed the benefits; but
all cases demonstrate the agency’s strong commitment to
accountability.
C. The IRS Seeks Accountability
In 1998 Congress passed the Internal Revenue Service
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, substantially changing the
regulatory environment of the IRS.225 One of the goals of the act
was to increase the agency’s accountability.226 The reform was
passed amid substantial accusations of lack of accountability. In a
typical example, Senator Grassley said the IRS:
“[S]eems to be squeezing the little guy to get the money while
this set of four witnesses are telling us that the big tax liability is
often forgiven. And the cause of this, of course, I think, and it is
the basic unfairness is the lack of accountability.”227
220

Id. at 17.
Bonner, supra note 215, at 147.
222
Id. at n.21; Online Publication Title List, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://nepis.epa.gov/EPA/html/Pubs/pubtitleOther.htm (last updated Sept. 14,
2010) (providing brochures on public involvement, numbered 233F03005-12,
233F03014).
223
Public Involvement Policy of the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, (May 2003), http://www.epa.gov/public
involvement/policy2003/finalpolicy.pdf.
224
BEIERLE, supra note 214, at 8.
225
Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub.
L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685, available at http://www.gpo.gov:80/fdsys/pkg/
PLAW-105publ206/pdf/PLAW-105publ206.pdf.
226
E.g., Henning, supra note 135.
227
IRS Oversight, supra note 38 (statement of Sen. Charles E. Grassley,
221
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Similarly, Senator Frank Murkowski from Alaska said: “[W]e
agreed that there was no accountability in the IRS. We agreed that
the system was designed to avoid accountability.”228 To correct
that, among other things, the Act made customer service one of the
main goals the IRS should aspire to, and added a variety of
accountability mechanisms.229
It is of course true that this reform was imposed from the
outside by Congress, and had input from some members who were
actively hostile to the IRS.230 However, the IRS Commissioner,
Charles O. Rossotti strongly supported reforming the agency and
had substantial input into some of the provisions of the Act.231
Rossotti continued to express commitment to the reform, and under
his direction the IRS engaged in substantial efforts to increase its
accountability, efforts that continued under Commissioner
Shulman.232 These reforms paralleled and reinforced ongoing
efforts of officials inside the IRS, which had begun before the
reform, to increase its transparency and responsiveness.233
This section will mention two examples: the Taxpayer
Advocacy Panel, which allowed a panel of citizens substantial
input into the IRS’s operations, and the efforts to increase the
accuracy and transparency of the IRS policies. This is a shortened
description; both efforts deserve a much more detailed treatment,
but that is a matter for another article.

Iowa).
228

Id. at 9 (statement of Sen. Frank S. Murkowski, Alaska).
See Thorndike, supra note 135, at 768. Some of these were quite
draconian; for example, the “ten deadly sins” provision decreed that IRS
employees will be fired if they violated one of its ten vague provisions (e.g.
violating any of the internal Revenue Manual provisions). See Rainey &
Thompson, supra note 9, at 599.
230
See Thorndike, supra note 135.
231
Id. at 775–77; Rainey & Thompson, supra note 9, at 597.
232
Telephone Interview with IRS official (under promise of confidentiality)
(June 24, 2009).
233
Id.; Telephone Interview with IRS official (under promise of
confidentiality) (July 1, 2009); Telephone Interview with Deborah Gascard
Wolf, Director of the Office of Privacy, Information Protection and Data
Security, IRS (July 14, 2009).
229
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1. Taxpayer Advocacy Panel

In 2002 the Department of the Treasury, together with high
IRS officials and the Taxpayer Advocate, Nina Olson, created the
Taxpayer Advocacy Panel.234 The panel is a collection of one
hundred volunteer citizens, organized into a number of issue
committees, who contribute three hundred hours each to reviewing
the IRS activity and offer recommendations for improvements. The
reports that come out of this activity include very detailed
recommendations by the panel and a response—often detailed—
from the relevant IRS official. The response can be adoption of the
panel’s recommendations,235 a promise to consider them,236 or
234

See What We Do, TAXPAYER ADVOCACY PANEL, http://www.im
proveirs.org/about-us/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2011) (describing the panel).
According to the TAP’s first annual report from 2003, it was created when
[t]he Department of the Treasury, in response to a review of Federal
Advisory Committee Act Boards, recommended nation-wide expansion
of the Citizen Advocacy Panel established in June 1998, to be renamed
the Taxpayer Advocacy Panel (TAP). The Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) established a Design Steering Committee comprised of the
National Taxpayer Advocate, Executives from Wage & Investment
(W&I), Small Business/Self Employed (SB/SE), the Communications
and Liaison Office, and National Treasury Employees Union
Representatives to design the new Panel.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAXPAYER ADVOCACY PANEL ANNUAL REPORT ii
(Dec. 31, 2003), http://www.improveirs.org/Content/documents/annual%20
reports/2003AnnualReport.pdf.
235
See, e.g., Taxpayer Advocacy Panel Recommendations, http://www.im
proveirs.org/Content/documents/recommendations/2007-Recommendations_
10_29_2009.pdf:
The Committee recommended and the OTBR [Office of Taxpayer
Burden Reduction. D.R.] accepted the recommendations of removing,
modifying and/or consolidating lines on the Form 2678 and on the
Schedule R (Form 941). The OTBR also accepted the recommendation
to make some minor changes to the verbiage on both forms. A major
change to the Form 2678 was to have both employer and agent’s
signature on the Form as opposed to only having the employer’s
signature as in the past.
236
See, e.g., id. at 7:
Form 12153 is a critical part of Collection Due Process that begins the

REISS - FINAL.DOC

5/9/2011 4:02 PM

Account Me In

667

rejection with an explanation.237
To give one example, as part of the effort to protect citizens’
privacy by reducing the availability of social security numbers, the
IRS is working on regulations that will allow issuers of form
1099238 to only provide some digits of the social security number
rather than the entire number. That decision, explained Deborah
Wolf, Director of Privacy, Information Protection and Data
Security in the IRS, was the result of a recommendation by the
Information Reporting Advisory Committee, a committee of the
Taxpayer Advocacy Panel.239 The committee recommended
treating the W2 forms provided by employers in a similar fashion,
but that requires a change in legislation, which will take longer.240
The creation and continuing existence of the Taxpayer
Advocacy Panel shows in two ways how the two agencies (the IRS
and the Treasury) are actively working to increase their
accountability. First, the Treasury Department acted voluntarily to
create the panel (with collaboration by the IRS). Second, the IRS
regularly engages in dialogue with the panel, with top officials
responding to panel recommendations in ways that can include
changes in policies in accordance with what the panel has
recommended—again, opening themselves to criticisms of their
response and to input from stakeholders.

hearing process when the form is received by Collection. With that in
mind, it is important that taxpayers understand the intent of the form,
how to complete the form, and when and where to return the form.
Your comments and suggestions will help us improve the form to meet
these goals.
237
As was done for one of the recommendations in TAP A07-4066. See id.
at 8–9.
238
Form 1099 is used to report withholding of a variety of incomes,
including, commonly, interest. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INSTRUCTIONS FOR
FORM 1099-MISC (2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1099
msc.pdf.
239
Telephone Interview with Deborah Gascard Wolf, supra note 233.
240
Id.
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2. Increasing Transparency and Accuracy of the Internal Revenue
Manual
The core of this discussion is the IRS’s effort to increase its
transparency through making its policies more easily accessible.
One of the criticisms raised against the agency in the discussions
leading to the 1998 reform was the lack of transparency of its
policies, which sometimes had the effect of making life very
difficult for citizens who had been accused of non-compliance due
to errors.241 Even before that, the IRS had been working on
improving the transparency in its policies and procedures.
However, it seems—though the causality is hard to trace—that the
criticisms raised during the reform gave the project of increasing
transparency an extra push. The IRS expressed a commitment to
making the Internal Revenue Manual (“IRM”) reflect current
policies (not easy for an extremely large agency with an annual
deadline) and has taken a series of steps in that direction.242 The
Office of Servicewide Policy, Directives and Electronic Research
(“SPDER”), created in 1999, engaged in a series of initiatives to
oversee and coordinate transparency, including sending out
memoranda reminding staff of the need to make interim guidance
available to the public and to train staff accordingly. Guided by
SPDER, the IRS units created and implemented internal
procedures to post interim guidance memoranda electronically, a
process monitored by SPDER.
As a first step, SPDER worked to change the format of the
IRM from paper to electronic and to restructure it so that it was
organized by processes rather than by the IRS organizational units.
The change to an electronic format was crucial to achieve accuracy
and accessibility. An electronic format was easier to distribute and
review. It was also easier to search, and thus made it easier to find
241

See generally Henning, supra note 135.
The description is taken from the comments of IRS officials to the
Taxpayer Advocate’s criticisms of their lack of transparency. 1 NAT’L
TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., 2006 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 24–26
(2006), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2006_arc_vol_1_cover__section_1.pdf.
The substance of the descriptions has been acknowledged by the National
Taxpayer Advocate. Id. at 27.
242
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inconsistencies when searches came up with a variety of results.243
Prior to the changes, the IRM was organized by unit, by the
title of the office, not by the process in question—which made it
easy for office members to update, but hard for people outside the
IRS to know their way around. It also made it very easy for
inconsistencies to be generated in relation to specific processes and
for inconsistencies to persist. This first step presented both an
administrative challenge—it was a large reorganization—and an
educational challenge: members of the staff had to be convinced
that the change was necessary, or at least inevitable. Some
resistance was encountered because many employees strongly
identified with their particular units.244
SPDER also invests substantially in training IRM authors in
how to write the manual in a transparent and easy to use way,
offering aggressive (though voluntary) training programs.245 The
goal is to write the IRM following information mapping principles,
active voice, and plain language.
Another change was a revision of the policy governing
disclosure of materials which are intended only for internal use.246
Prior to the mid 2000s, the agency’s policy was not to publish
documents if any part of that document was for official use only.
SPDER initiated a redaction process whereby paragraphs that are
for internal use only are removed from documents, and what
remains is published, substantially increasing the amount of
publicly available material.247
As can be seen from this very short description, substantial
efforts were made by the IRS to increase the transparency and
accessibility of its policy.
243

Telephone Interview with IRS official (under promise of confidentiality)
(July 1, 2009); Telephone Interview with IRS official (under promise of
confidentiality) (June 24, 2009).
244
Telephone Interview with IRS official (under promise of confidentiality)
(July 1, 2009).
245
Id.
246
Which may fall under any of a number of exemptions to FOIA. See
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 552(b)(2), (5), (7) (West 2010).
247
Telephone Interview with IRS official (under promise of confidentiality)
(July 1, 2009). A more detailed description of the IRS reforms is in preparation.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS AND DISCUSSION
A. What is NOT Implied?
Let’s start with what this Article is not intended to imply. I am
not saying that the need for external accountability mechanisms is
obviated by the discovery that agencies often will be accountable
on their own. Most of the efforts to increase accountability
described in this Article were undertaken by agencies facing the
vast array of accountability mechanisms described in Part I, and
their actions were taken in the context of those mechanisms.
Further, as the case studies demonstrate, the agencies making these
efforts were agencies “under fire”—they were already being
subjected to substantial criticism for, among other things, lack of
accountability. The IRS already faced the experience of
accountability mechanisms added, and massive reorganization
imposed, because of accusations of lack of accountability that
stuck.248 It is unclear whether the agencies would have made the
same kinds of efforts to be accountable without external
accountability pressures, but a strong argument can be made that at
least in part their efforts to increase accountability were motivated
by the desire to head off more external attempts to do it for them. It
does not require evil intent for agencies not to undertake such
efforts: agencies have many other tasks besides being accountable,
and without strong motivators to invest in accountability, these can
easily (and possibly with good reason) take precedence.
Beyond that, even an agency that is strongly committed to
accountability because of its sense of mission may not construct
accountability mechanisms in ways that are valued by either its
political masters or the public in general. Those outside the agency
may have different preferences than the agency as to what form the
accountability should take, and how it should be structured, and
without external mechanisms they may not be able to influence an
agency’s choice. For example, the EPA’s design of the
accountability framework surrounding IRIS was strongly criticized
by the GAO as damaging to its efficiency, and by OMB Watch as
248

See supra Part III.C.

REISS - FINAL.DOC

5/9/2011 4:02 PM

Account Me In

671

inserting a political component into a professional decision.249 The
FDA’s decision to summarize and publish information about its
decisions on new drug applications was criticized by industry
members for providing too much information and harming the
industry, and by consumer protection organizations for not
providing enough data.250
Even if the motivations of the agency are accepted as valid, and
an agency strongly buys into the accountability language, it may
not be especially well versed in the tools and mechanisms
available. An agency may lack expertise and not do a particularly
good job of increasing its accountability even if it is extremely
professional in other areas. For example, while the IRS has been
making efforts to increase the transparency of its policies for
several years, the 2006 Taxpayer Advocate Service Annual Report
highlighted certain problems, such as internal memos not
published.251 Hutt sees the FDA as working to increase its
transparency, but as demonstrated in Part II.A, external observers
criticize it for lack of transparency. External direction may be
required to help agencies steer their accountability choices.
Finally, as demonstrated by the example of the Minerals
Management Service,252 not all agencies seek accountability—or
are accountable—all the time, and to prevent extreme cases of
abuses, external mechanisms are crucial.
The other thing I am not asserting in this Article is that efforts
by agencies to increase accountability are generally successful.
Assessing success of accountability mechanisms requires two
complex, challenging inquiries, neither of which I undertake here.
The first is a value judgment as to just what a successful
accountability mechanism would look like. For example, suppose
it is a mechanism that increases input from outside parties; if that
proves so effective that it gives stakeholders or citizens full
control, is that outcome desirable, or not? Substantial input from
249

See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part III.A.
251
1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., 2006 ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS 21 (2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2006_arc_vol_
1_cover__section_1.pdf.
252
See supra Part I.A.
250
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stakeholders can be seen as an agency being responsive or as an
agency captured; in the matter of public participation, some
scholars strongly support extensive participation,253 others are
concerned that it may harm expertise and decision making.254 As
for publication, the benefits and costs of transparency are also
debated.255 If increasing transparency is a good, should agencies
provide more information or provide information in a more
simplified, easy to access way?
Agreeing on some standardized benchmarks is one challenge to
making a scholarly assessment of success at improving
accountability; another challenge is presented by the wide range of
empirical measurement problems that exist—experimental design
and data collection present serious difficulties in real-world
situations. For instance, if we agree that public participation and
input of citizens into the process is a good, how do we measure
whether there actually was input? Do we look at the number of
participants and the number of comments they made, as was done
in studies evaluating participation in rulemaking?256 This approach
can be challenged on the grounds that “comments” can be nothing
but answers checked off on standardized forms, or that merely
submitting comments does not mean that any effective input to the
process occurred.257 Or, alternatively, do we look at ways the
agency may have changed its views after receipt of the comments?
This is another measure some of the same scholars used. Here, we
can ask whether “change” is for the better or not—change is not

253

See generally James S. Fishkin, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION: NEW
DIRECTIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORM (1991); LEIB, supra note 101; Arnstein,
supra note 101; Innes & Booher, supra note 101.
254
Coglianese, Is Consensus an Appropriate Basis for Regulatory Policy?,
supra note 105, at 93–113.
255
See generally ARCHON FUNG ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS
AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY (2007); Mark Fenster, The Opacity of
Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885 (2006); Hood, supra note 69.
256
Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57
ADMIN. L. REV. 411, 414–15; Golden, supra note 104, at 245–47; West, supra
note 14, at 66–70.
257
See Reiss, Tailored Participation, supra note 20, at 331–35; Schlosberg,
supra note 103.
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always justified.258 A more general reason this Article does not
address the question of assessment is that while there is room and
need for articles examining the success of efforts at increasing
accountability, this article has a different focus.259 Accordingly,
this Article is not being presented as evidence that agencies do a
good job at being accountable—just that they try.
B. What is Implied?
In this Article I intend to show that agencies are not always the
enemy in the “accountability game” and are never just a pawn
either. First, as to agencies not being the enemy—as this Article
demonstrates, important agencies make substantial efforts to
increase their accountability and agency officials often buy into
reforms aimed at increasing accountability. Several of the
mechanisms later adopted by Congress or the courts were initially
tested or adopted by agencies. For example, the FDA adopted a
preamble requirement and a requirement of answering comments
independent from judicial review; in addition, various agencies
experimented with negotiated rulemaking before Congress passed
an act that mandated it.
The case studies suggest that a variety of motivations influence
agencies to make these efforts. For example, a typical case is that
of an agency under attack trying to improve its accountability so as
to reduce the severity of the attacks and simultaneously make real
improvements in performance. All three agencies that I report on
in this Article acted to increase their accountability after being
strongly attacked. This would support the view that agencies are
258

Several studies have already attempted to analyze the actual impact of
comments. See, e.g., Cuéllar, supra note 256, at 433–34; Golden, supra note
104, at 261; West, supra note 14, at 68; Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb
Yackee, A Bias Towards Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the
U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 J. POL. 128 (2006).
259
See, e.g., Martina Vidovic & Neha Khanna, Can Voluntary Pollution
Prevention Programs Fulfill Their Promises? Further Evidence from the EPA’s
33/50 Program, 53 ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 180, 180–83 (2007); Michael R.
Greenberg & Justin Hollander, The Environmental Protection Agency’s
Brownfields Pilot Program, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 277, 277–79 (2006)
(indicating how complicated the methodology of evaluating a program is).
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unwilling participants in the accountability game. However, the
extent of agencies’ efforts and their level of innovation suggest that
a desire to avoid punishment was not the only thing driving the
agencies—a level of commitment to the idea of accountability, and
some effect of the ideas of participation and transparency, also
exists.
My second major point is that viewing agencies as the
“subject” is a mistake. Much of the accountability literature sees
agencies as being “acted upon,” as primarily responding to
accountability mechanisms put in place by others. The famous
McNollgast studies address how Congress can shape agencies’
environment to assure compliance with Congressional
preferences.260 Studies of judicial review focus on behavior and
how courts evaluate agencies,261 rather than seeing the agency and
courts as co-participants in the game, with the agency having
substantial power to affect how a court will review it.262 Agencies
are typically sophisticated political actors.263 They can and do
260

McCubbins, Administrative Procedures, supra note 16, at 243–45;
McCubbins, Structure and Process, supra note 16.
261
See, e.g., Stephen M. Johnson, Bringing Deference Back (But For How
Long?): Justice Alito, Chevron, Auer, and Chenery in the Supreme Court’s 2006
Term, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 1 (2007); Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron:
An Empricial Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15
YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1998); Nicholas J. Leddy, Determining Due Deference:
Examining When Courts Should Defer to Agency Use of Presidential Signing
Statements, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 869 (2007); Pierce, Judicial Review, supra note
92; Thomas O. Sargentich, The Critique of Active Judicial Review of
Administrative Agencies: A Reevaluation, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 599 (1997).
262
With some exceptions—one possible exception is O’Reilly, Losing
Deference, supra note 17, at 949–50, 977–78 (loss of deference to FDA is
largely because it became captured by political actors). But see David C.
Vladeck, The FDA and Deference Lost: A Self-inflicted Wound or the Product of
a Wounded Agency? A Response to Professor O’Reilly, 93 CORNELL L. REV.
981, 983–85 (2008) (offering an opposing view).
263
See, e.g., CARPENTER, supra note 57, at 19–25; Reiss, Agency
Accountability, supra note 46, at 114–15; Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Administrative
Agencies as Creators of Administrative Law Norms: Evidence from the UK,
France and Sweden, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 373–74 (Susan
Rose-Ackerman & Peter Lindseth eds. 2010) (unpublished copy on file with
author); JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY— WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
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influence their accountability environment. Agencies do respond to
other actors, but they also tailor their behaviors in ways that will
help achieve the best accountability environment they can, given
the political and institutional constraints they face.264 One way
agencies can influence their environment is by making efforts of
their own to increase their accountability, thus preempting external
efforts. This suggests a number of important policy implications
for current administrative law and practice.
An important question is how to incentivize agencies to
undertake more efforts to increase their accountability—assuming
that increased accountability is considered necessary.265 If
accountability is a positive, more accountability is better than less,
and we want agencies to be more accountable. But if that is the
case, maybe agencies should be rewarded for their efforts at
increasing accountability. Lack of incentives may lead agencies to
work to improve accountability less often than is desirable. For
example, a plausible argument is that the relative rarity of
negotiated rulemaking undertaken by agencies can be explained by
a lack of incentives. Several studies suggest that even if the
participants are satisfied with the process,266 from the agency’s
point of view there may not be sufficient incentive, since it still has
to go through the regular notice and comment procedures anyway.
At any rate, in spite of efforts by the Clinton administration to
increase the use of negotiated rulemaking,267 the number of such
DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 27–28, 88–89 (1989).
264
See Reiss, Agency Accountability, supra note 46, at 114–15.
265
Not at all obvious—as the “Agencies as Victims” literature described in
Part I.B demonstrates, a strong claim may be made that there is enough, if not
too much, accountability already in the administrative state. However, the claim
for more accountability seems to be stronger—and even if we do not think
MORE accountability is a positive, better accountability may be—more
streamlined and efficient tools that achieve the same effects.
266
Harter, Assessing the Assessors, supra note 201, at 55–56; Laura I.
Langbein & Cornelius M. Kerwin, Regulatory Negotiation v. Conventional
Rulemaking: Claims, Counterclaims and Empirical Evidence, 10 J. PUB. ADMIN.
RES. & THEORY 599, 625–26 (2000). But see Cary Coglianese, Assessing the
Advocacy, supra note 201, at 404–06 (challenging the methodological tools and
conclusions of these studies).
267
Harter, Assessing the Assessors, supra note 201, at 36–37.
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rulemakings remains very small.268 One incentive may be reducing
some of the external controls for agencies which engage in their
own processes—following the same logic as the EPA’s voluntary
compliance plans that carry with them the suggestion of reduced
enforcement against participants.269 This will probably require
legislation. Another incentive would be to allow agencies brought
to court with claims of lack of participation or transparency to
present evidence of efforts to increase their accountability and
provide a holistic picture of accountability.
One way for a court to deal with a claim of insufficient
participation or transparency is to charge the agency with
producing a plan for increasing accountability, thus taking
advantage of the ability of agencies to create their own
accountability mechanisms. That way, the court does not directly
dictate new procedures—forbidden under Vermont Yankee270—but
can still address a lack of sufficient procedures. Courts may be less
reluctant to allow agencies to use guidelines271 if the agencies
268

Coglianese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 191, at 1276–77.
See Richard N.L. Andrews et al., Environmental Management Systems:
History, Theory, and Implementation Research, in REGULATING FROM THE
INSIDE: CAN ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ACHIEVE POLICY
GOALS? 32–33, 42–43 (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., 2001).
270
Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S.
519, 523–25 (1978).
271
For example, the D.C. Circuit criticized agencies for using guidance
documents instead of rulemaking and avoiding rulemaking in two cases. See
Gen. Elec. Co. v. E.P.A., 290 F.3d 377, 384–85 (2002) (not addressing what
procedures were used in the issuance of the guidance document); Appalachian
Power Co. v. E.P.A., 208 F.3d 1015, 1020 (2000):
The phenomenon we see in this case is familiar. Congress passes a
broadly worded statute. The agency follows with regulations containing
broad language, open-ended phrases, ambiguous standards and the like.
Then as years pass, the agency issues circulars or guidance or
memoranda, explaining, interpreting, defining and often expanding the
commands in the regulations. One guidance document may yield
another and then another and so on. Several words in a regulation may
spawn hundreds of pages of text as the agency offers more and more
detail regarding what its regulations demand of regulated entities. Law
is made, without notice and comment, without public participation, and
without publication in the Federal Register or the Code of Federal
269
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present a scheme for making sure those guidelines are transparent
and allow for stakeholder input into their making. Guidelines have
a number of advantages over rules: they are more flexible, and
therefore may be more suitable to fast-changing environments,
they do not suffer from the same degree of ossification,272 and they
allow—in fact, mandate—agency deviation in appropriate specific
cases. Allowing guidelines an official place under these narrow
circumstances is especially useful since the jurisprudence about
policy documents versus rules is vague and the criteria to
distinguish them are unclear.273 If an agency created a document
that could fall under either category through a process that either
closely follows informal rulemaking procedures or goes beyond
them and adds substantial accountability guarantees, why
invalidate it?
This need for incentives is especially true since one of the
challenges any agency head will face is that of competing demands
on time; achieving accountability requires time and effort. For
example, in the case of the FDA, when confronted with changes in
the agency’s enabling act along with demands for investigation of
alleged misrepresentations of the results of clinical trials, drafting
the Medical Device Act of 1976, and a large range of other
missions, promoting accountability was not always the first
priority.274 Similarly, updating the Internal Revenue Manual to
keep IRS policies transparent may not be the first priority for an
official burdened with many other chores. One IRS official
explained that it is seen as “record keeping,” and often with “so
Regulations. With the advent of the Internet, the agency does not need
these official publications to ensure widespread circulation; it can
inform those affected simply by posting its new guidance or
memoranda or policy statement on its web site.
272
Lubbers, The Transformation, supra note 18, at 471–72. See also Peter
L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463, 1480–82 (1992)
[hereinafter Strauus, The Rulemaking Continuum].
273
On this difficulty, see Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946
(D.C. Cir. 1987); Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, supra note 272, at 1476–
79. For the negative effects of the difficulty see Richard M. Thomas,
Prosecutorial Discretion and Agency Self-Regulation: CNI v. Young and the
Aflatoxin Dance, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 155 (1992).
274
Telephone Interview with Richard A. Merrill, supra note 145.
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many other things to do, if they look at a list of priorities, IRM and
updating it falls to the bottom of the list.”275 According some
deference to an agency engaged in accountability seeking can help
balance those costs and provide an incentive for such behavior.
In addition to creating incentives, acknowledging that agencies
engage in increasing accountability can open the door to more
systematic study of such activity, as suggested by Magill in the
context of self-regulation.276 Besides providing a promising source
of information and thought for researchers trying to understand
agency action, it can make a wealth of information more
systematically available that will be useful for policy makers in all
three branches. If one of the justifications for federalism is
experimentation in different forms of democracy to allow
innovation and the testing of ideas,277 the same can be said for
experimentation with accountability mechanisms among agencies:
a type of “administrative federalism.” If agencies are allowed, even
encouraged, to experiment, all three branches can benefit.
The branch with the most natural access, and the one already
benefitting from such experimentation, is the executive branch.
Agencies learn from each other—for example, other agencies
emulated the experience of the first agencies with negotiated
rulemaking, and OMB incorporated it into an executive order,
recommending it to all agencies.278
This learning can be made even more systematic if we learn
from other countries’ experience. For example, in Australia, there
is an “Office of Best Practice Regulation” to study how to make
regulation better, including increasing its transparency.279 Another
potential international source of inspiration is the Organisation for
275

Telephone Interview with IRS official (under promise of confidentiality)
(July 1, 2009).
276
See Magill, supra note 59, at 860–61.
277
See Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Federalism: “Converse-1983” in
Context, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1229, 1233–36 (1994).
278
Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a), 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. § 601 app. at 557–61 (1994).
279
See Office of Best Practice Regulation, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T, DEP’T FIN.
& DEREGULATION, http://www.finance.gov.au/obpr/about/ (last updated July 5,
2010).
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Economic Co-operation & Development’s (OECD) report
comparing best practices across countries.280
Similarly, examining accountability mechanisms created by
agencies could provide Congress with ideas for new accountability
mechanisms and with real-world data as to what worked and what
did not, thus facilitating the making of informed decisions when
drafting legislation.
Finally, knowledge of agency practices could guide courts as to
where to put—and where to avoid—emphasis. If a mechanism
were found to have been widely adopted by agencies and seemed
to be working, that could justify increased deference.281
Just as important, agencies engaging in increasing
accountability require training and resources to do so. For
example, in an age where transparency is increasing through use of
online mechanisms, agencies need training in the use of
information technology, and in many cases personnel with new
kinds of abilities. Some agencies have already started hiring people
with new skills:
[SPDER] hired a college professor to help with curriculum
and the tax forms[,] . . . someone with background in
lobbying . . . [, and] an IT person, working on the move to
an electronic environment. . . . I would not have thought I
would hire them, but as times change we need people with
different skills.282
But for a variety of reasons, including budgetary constraints,
this may not have been enough. These needs must be taken into
consideration.

280

Cesar Cordova-Novion, Simple, Effective, Transparent Regulation: Best
Practices in OECD Countries, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION &
DEVELOPMENT, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/26/1897852.ppt (last visited
Jan. 26, 2011).
281
I suspect some of the requirements placed on agencies by courts over
the years were actually ideas borrowed from existing agency practices, either in
or across agencies. But that is a topic for another project and requires further
research.
282
Telephone Interview with IRS official (under promise of confidentiality)
(Aug. 3, 2009).
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CONCLUSION
This Article suggests that agencies are accountable, and
furthermore, that many agencies want to be accountable and make
efforts in that direction. It suggests that agencies’ efforts to
increase their accountability are not sufficiently noticed or
acknowledged. In relation to their accountability behavior,
agencies are either criticized or pitied in most of the current
literature. Both approaches are too simplistic. In terms of criticism,
being an administrator in the United States is an exceedingly
difficult job. The United States is large and complex, which makes
managing any problem difficult. Its political system is
decentralized, which adds another layer of complexity—as if
managing services or regulation for three hundred million people
would not be enough, it needs to be done in a fragmented system
with many veto points.283 And like most modern states, it engages
in many different spheres of activities.284 This already makes an
administrator’s job hard. In addition, administrators in the United
States are everyone’s favorite whipping boy and routinely
criticized, among other things for their lack of accountability. 285
This Article suggests that these claims are at least one-sided
and ignore an important part of the picture. The accusation that
bureaucrats are unaccountable and seek to avoid the public eye is,
at best, of limited validity, and at any rate, requires proof before it
can be made. In many situations, it is just not true.
The concern about agency victimization and too much
accountability also focuses only on part of the picture, treating
agencies as lacking control of their environment and ignoring their
contribution to the accountability reality.
This Article is an attempt to give a fuller picture. Agencies also
contribute to their accountability environment, by acting, at times,
as “accountability entrepreneurs” and at other times as
accountability brokers.
Does that mean we do not need to worry about agency
283
284
285

KAGAN, supra note 48 at 42.
See MEIER, supra note 13, at 2–5.
See examples supra Part I.A.
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accountability? Unfortunately no. First, efforts by agencies to be
accountable may not be effective, or may aim at the wrong
problems. So, even when we do not need to worry about the
motives of agencies in relation to accountability, we still need to
worry about the design of accountability. Second, agencies still
face the problem of multiple principals, and their priorities may
differ from those of the Congress or the public.286 Assuming that
legislative supremacy is ingrained and required under the
American constitutional scheme, efforts may be necessary to align
agency accountability behavior with congressional preferences.
Finally, not all agencies will make these efforts, and those that do
may not make them all the time.
Even so, taking all of the foregoing caveats into account and
giving each its full weight, it still seems clear that we cannot
ignore agencies’ efforts to increase their own accountability.

286

See Furlong, supra note 97, at 61.

